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This dissertation’s main focus is the study of supply chain resilience. The two 
studies investigate the impact of supply chain geographical locations risks and supply 
chain resilience on performance and of supply chain risks and disruptive events in 
resilience strategies.   
Essay 1 seeks to understand the impact of supply chain resilience strategies on 
firm’s performance. We utilize a cross sectional data sample from 2014 containing 
detailed manufacturing location risk data and resilience planning at the location level 
for 313 publicly traded firms. We look at three supply chain resilience cultural traits, 
business continuity planning, inventory and financial stability. We find that resilience 
has a positive effect on firm performance.  
  
Essay 2 looks at the impact of two types of supply chain risks (internal and 
external) and two types of disruptive events (internal and external) in the 
development of supply chain resilience strategies. We find that external disruptive 
events have a positive impact on supply chain resilience but internal disruptive events 
have a negative impact in the development of resilience. However, once a business 
continuity plan is in place, previous internal disruptive events are associated with 
more agility.  
My findings for both essays contribute to the supply chain resilience literature 
by empirically testing the impact of resilience on performance and the impact of 
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Chapter 1: Overview 
The two essays of this dissertation will focus on supply chain risks and 
resilience. Supply chain resilience has become an important topic for both researchers 
and practitioners due to the turbulent environment in which multinational firms have 
to operate in. Natural disasters, political instability of different countries and 
economical disasters can impact a firm’s capacity to move its products to consumers. 
Supply chain resilience presents an opportunity to protect the supply chain against 
disruptions and maintain or even improve firm performance. 
Essay 1 of my dissertation analyzes a cross sectional sample of 313 firms 
across 40 3-digit NAICS code industries and how supply chain geographical risks and 
resilience impact performance. We framed our hypotheses using Structure-Conduct-
Performance paradigm to explain the relationships between our variables and 
establish our hypotheses. We expect, based on the literature, that resilience will pose 
a competitive advantage for firms that operate in risky environments, effectively 
mitigating the impact of risk on performance. 
Essay 2 analyzes a cross sectional sample of 159 firms across 3 industries. 
Essay 2 focuses on the impact of two types of risks and disruptive events, external 
and internal, on the resilience strategies put in place by the firm. We look at two 
strategies: business continuity planning and average projected recovery time after a 
disruption. We pose that the higher the exposure to risks and disruptive events a firm 
faces, the more likely it will be to have resilience strategies in place in order to cope 




Chapter 2: The Impact of Supply Chain Geographical Location 
Risks and Resilience on Firm Performance 
ABSTRACT 
The location of a manufacturing facility can present various risks to the firm’s 
supply chain. The impact of these risks is an understudied area that we address in this 
essay.  Our study uses Resilinc's supplier database to analyze 3,262 manufacturing 
locations for 313 publicly traded firms across 40 industries. This study examines the 
impact on firm performance (measured as gross margin) of supply chain geographical 
location environmental risks (measured as natural disaster risk and geopolitical risk) 
and firm resilience (measured as financial solidity, recovery time and inventory). 
Using a linear regression model adapted for industry clusters, we find that natural 
disaster risk and resilience have a positive impact on performance. A surprising 
finding shows that frequency of potential disruptions also has a positive impact on 





On September 20, 2017, hurricane María struck the island of Puerto Rico with 
its 155 miles per hour maximum winds and lots of water. The Puerto Rico 
government is still trying to estimate the total impact on the island’s economy almost 
four months after the storm. The current estimate of monetary is impact is 
approximately $100 billion. The hurricane not only affected the Puerto Rican 
economy by destroying houses, businesses, the power system in the entire island and 
structures like roads, bridges and government buildings. Global supply chains have 
also taken their toll from this big disruption. Examples are the pharmaceutical and 
medical devices industries. The medical devices industry has an important amount of 
production in Puerto Rico and about 8% of the medicines consumed in the US are 
manufactured in Puerto Rico (Aton, 2017). Due to the interruption on production that 
the factories suffered in the aftermath of the hurricane the Food and Drug 
Administration is currently tracking 30 critical pharmaceuticals and 50 critical 
medical devices manufactured solely in Puerto Rico or majorly in Puerto Rico, 
according to an article published by Scientific American on October 25, 2017 by 
Aton on EE News. 
The current situation in Puerto Rico is only the latest example of what supply 
chain disruptions can do to firms, industries and countries. Hendricks and Singhal 
(2003) lead the research on the impact of disruptions to firm performance. They 
studied public announcements of disruptions to production and deliveries and the 
impact that these events had on the stock value. They found significant negative 




Some studies of supply chain risk focused on assessing the risks with a focus 
on risk identification and avoidance (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). More recent studies 
focus on developing ways to mitigate the risks, accepting that disruptions are part of 
the supply chain global environment. Supply chain resilience has been proposed as an 
effective way to cope with the unavoidably risky environment in which firms have to 
operate (Sheffi, 2005). Is there something that firms operating in Puerto Rico could 
have done to avoid the impact from hurricane María? Hurricanes are not a new 
experience to the island, it is situated right in the middle of the hurricane zone. 
Hurricane María had a historical impact, word of mouth in Puerto Rico says that it 
has been the worst storm in a hundred years. Can the pharmaceutical and medical 
devices industries recover fast enough in order to avoid a crisis? Sheffi (2005) 
suggests that firms with an organizational culture of resilience would be able to find a 
solution and recover faster than firms with no culture of resilience, but not only 
during a disruption, resilient firms should be better performing firms due to the 
benefits that developing resilient processes bring to the firm. 
Our study aims to look at the impact of supply chain resilience on firm 
performance. Using a cross sectional data sample from 2014, we test the impact of 
three supply chain resilience cultural traits. We use the Structure-Conduct-





THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm developed by Mason 
(1939) and Bain (1951), establishes that there is a direct relationship between market 
structure, firm conduct and performance. Firms respond to the market environment in 
order to compete and obtain advantage from other firms. The SCP framework has 
been widely used in the strategy field, as illustrated by Williams and Smart (1993) 
literature review, to explain the reasons why firms develop certain strategies.  
In the current market of global competition, some authors have claimed that 
competition is no longer firm to firm but supply chain to supply chain, (Trkman et al, 
2007; Li et al, 2005). Not surprisingly, the supply chain literature has been 
intertwined with the strategy literature, (Glassman and Honeycutt, 2002; Hult, 
Ketchen and Arrfelt, 2007). Blackhurst et al. (2015) utilized the SCP framework to 
explain the positive impact that supply chain integration has on firm performance.  
Another theory that has been used to explain the dynamics of supply chains is 
Barney’s Resource Based View (RBV), (Barney, 1986). Squire, Autry and Petersen 
(2014) and Blackhurst et al. (2011) applied RBV to explain why firms develop 
resilience in their supply chains to cope with the risks of disruption that the business 
environment brings. Similarly, we propose that resiliency is one of the ways that 
firms respond to a turbulent market environment in order to enhance performance. 
We combine SCP and RBV with supply chain risk management and resilience 
literature to frame our hypotheses. We pose that in the modern global environment, 
there are characteristics to the market beyond market power and entry barriers that 




operating in a particular geographical location are an example of these environmental 
factors. The interpretation of “structure” that we are using, takes into consideration 
the implications that operating in a global market brings.  
Structure 
In the SCP framework, “structure” refers to market structure. Traditionally the 
market environment is measured in terms of market concentration and barriers to 
entry. Bain defined entry barriers as market conditions that allow incumbent firms to 
raise prices above the competitive level without attracting entry (Waldman and 
Jensen, 2007). Making decisions that reduce costs in order to obtain economies of 
scale is one strategic way to set prices and increase profits.  
Holweg, Reichart and Hong (2011) state that cost assessment for global 
sourcing is highly dependent on cost of production and transportation, but that this 
assessment is not complete. They posit that supply chain risks are often not included 
in the cost analysis, leading firms to make decisions to operate in high risk 
environments. Managing these environments creates additional costs.   
Christopher and Holweg (2011) studied how the global economy has changed 
over 40 years from 1970 to 2010. Using a volatility index, they show that the global 
economy has been more volatile since the economic crisis of 2007 than it had been 
historically, indicating that it is less predictable to conduct global business now than it 
was before the crisis. Since supply chains are the engines that address the movement 
of goods around the world preserving connectivity between nodes and functions, they 
propose that the design of modern supply chains should have embedded into it 




Knemeyer et al (2009) established that supply chain vulnerability has 
increased due to globalization and the availability of less slack. By operating in high 
risk countries in order to seek lower operational costs, the environment in which firms 
operate has become riskier for many supply chains. In a similar manner, many firms 
have chosen global networks that operate across different countries and move goods 
around the world for both production processes and customer deliveries. As global 
supply chains grow, the probability of facing disruptions also grows, forcing firms to 
operate in a potentially more disruptive environment. These trends are common 
across industries, even though the impact of globalization will vary by industry.  
i. Supply Chain Risk 
The British Dictionary defines risk as the possibility of incurring misfortune 
or loss. Carvalho and Cruz Machado (2007) state that when it comes to supply chain 
failures: “the sources of disturbance might be infinite, but the number of failures is 
finite.” They place supply chain/operational risks as resulting into five possible 
failures: 1) raw materials shortage, 2) labor shortage, 3) machine capacity shortage, 4) 
scrap/rework, 5) finished goods not delivered. In our study we consider supply chain 
risk to be the possibility of a firm incurring loss due to any of the five failures listed 
above.  
Rao and Goldsby (2009) developed a typology of the risks faced by a firm. 
These include both internal and external risks. One of the risk categories they propose 
encompasses external factors or “framework factors”, as defined by Ritchie and 




operates. The factors include environmental risks, industry risks and organizational 
risks, (Rao and Goldsby, 2009).  
Environmental risks include natural disaster risks, political risks, social risks 
and macroeconomic risks, (Rao and Goldsby, 2009). We understand that 
environmental risks can set up the structure of the market per SCP. This study focuses 
on geopolitical risk and natural disaster risk, and the impact that these risks have on 
firm performance. The first link we look at is a direct link between structure and 
performance.  Holweg et al. (2011) state that political risk is a hidden cost for firms, 
since they make the decision to go into higher risk countries based on predicted 
operating costs, without considering political risk. They pose that the additional 
hidden costs may exceed the operating cost savings from operating in high risk 
countries, but in their case study there is no irrefutable statistical evidence to support 
this argument.  
The tradeoff at hand is between the advantages that operating in a low cost 
country can bring and the hidden costs that political issues in that country can cause. 
Operational costs such as low labor costs, low inventory handling costs, low 
infrastructure costs and low cost of transportation are the main reasons why firms 
decide to invest in having a manufacturing presence at countries that are less 
politically stable, (Holweg et al., 2011). Ports and airports are critical points for any 
supply chain. If the country in which a firm is operating is impacted by a political 
crisis (a coup, an invasion, a dramatic change of government structure, etc) 
government owned agencies and processes will be affected as well along with the 




produce and move goods through the supply chain. The latter are the risks that 
Holweg et al. (2011) argue that are not being considered and therefore become hidden 
costs. Although the literature (Christopher and Holweg, 2011; Holweg et al., 2011) 
portrays a negative impact from operating in risky places, suggesting that these risks 
should be avoided, we believe that the cost benefits are still higher than the impact of 
the hidden costs. Holweg et al. (2011) utilized three case studies to test the impact of 
risk on performance. We expect that looking at a greater sample, results will vary 
depending on the firm and the places that the firm is operating in. We think that the 
global environment of business and the turbulence that comes with it have become 
the normal way of doing business and to deliver a low cost product has become an 
entry barrier. In order to penetrate a market, it is necessary to have a product with a 
competitive price. To compete in a global market, economies of scale are necessary in 
order to deliver an attractive price. High risk countries can bring this benefit. We 
expect higher geopolitical risk to be associated with higher performance.  
Natural disaster risk is slightly different from geopolitical risk. When it comes 
to hurricanes, for example, there is a hurricane season every year that goes roughly 
from June to November. Firms operating in places located in the hurricane zone, can 
expect to be impacted during that time of the year more than at any other time of the 
year. Earthquakes are completely different and much less predictable. However, 
natural disasters are disasters that do follow patterns. Even though it would be almost 
impossible to predict one precisely, it can be estimated statiscally that certain places 
will be impacted in a certain time range. In “the next five or ten years”, depending on 




probabilities of being affected and calculate insurance premiums (Sheffi 2005). 
Countries exposed to natural disasters are similar to countries with geopolitical risk in 
terms of low operational costs. They can provide the same advantages of low cost 
labor and low cost operations. They present an important difference from 
geopolitically unstable countries that it would be easier for firms to defend from the 
environment because statistical data is more reliable and the probability of an event 
does not depend on human action. These countries are also attractive for 
manufacturing due to the cost advantage they represent. For this reason we expect 
natural disaster risk to have a positive impact on performance.  
Our first hypothesis is divided in two parts to consider both risk types 
individually because we are interested in understanding if the difference between the 
two risk types are enough to have a different impact on performance. Hypothesis one 
is as follows: 
H1: Higher location environmental risk will be positively   
 associated with firm performance. 
H1a: Higher geopolitical risk will be positively associated with 
firm performance. 
H1b: Higher natural disaster risk will be positively associated 
with firm performance. 
ii. Supply Chain Complexity 
Complexity in the supply chain is not only provided by the global 
environment, but also by the complexity of the products and the number of nodes in 




supply chain: horizontal (# of direct suppliers), vertical (# of tiers) and spatial (# of 
countries). They found that complexity increases disruption frequency, therefore 
impacting the performance of the supply chain network. Blackhurst, Dunn and 
Craighead (2011) studied complexity in terms of the size of the network given by the 
number of nodes and the connectivity between nodes. They find that complexity 
reduces resilience, making the firm more vulnerable to its environment. Although 
none of these two studies refers to product complexity, we understand the more 
components a product has, the more horizontal complexity the firm will have because 
it will require more suppliers. A product with a complex design could imply more 
stages of production which will also impact the number of tiers for its supply chain. 
In this study we will look at a combination of product complexity and network size 
complexity. We are not able to define complexity in the same ways Bode and Wagner 
(2015) and Craighead (2011) did due to data limitations, but product complexity 
combines both studies as it poses a risk for the supply chain to be bigger and more 
exposed to be disrupted. Following their findings, we expect product complexity to 
have a direct negative impact on performance. Complexity makes for a more difficult 
to manage environment, hence our second hypothesis is: 
H2: Supply chain product and network complexity will be negatively 
associated with firm performance 
iii. Disruptive Events 
The last environmental factor we consider is the number of disruptive events 
that a firm experiences. Although the media has contributed immensely to raising 




fails to delve into the factors that would be helpful for researchers to better 
understand the risk management process. In terms of supply chain risks and 
disruptions, low probability, high impact disruptions tend to get most of the attention, 
while “everyday risks” that might be low to medium impact events do not get much 
notice.  
Hendricks and Singhal (2003) have contributed to the literature by empirically 
establishing relationships between risks, disruptions and firm performance. Their 
research allows us to understand why the study of supply chain risk and supply chain 
risk management is not only interesting but also relevant and important. They have 
established that supply chain disruptions have a negative effect on stock performance 
(Hendricks and Singhal, 2003), that disruptions have a long-term effect on stock 
performance and equity risk (Hedricks and Singhal, 2005a), and that supply chain 
disruptions negatively impact operating performance, (Hendricks and Singhal, 
2005b). They have also studied the impact of mitigation strategies, such as 
operational slack and diversification, on the disruption events (Hendricks et al., 
2009). With their findings, the authors have established the importance of supply 
chain risk awareness and mitigation, and its main goal to protect the performance of 
the firm.  
Sheffi (2005) presents a collection of case studies based on different 
disruptions that a diverse selection of firms have faced. The aftermath of these 
disruptions ranges from loss of sales in that year to (at the extreme) bankruptcy. 




happen that a firm may have missed. Suggesting that it is possible to learn from lesser 
impact events and be better prepared or even avoid a bigger impact event. 
Other studies have focused on identifying ways to predict the impact of 
disruptions or to calculate the probability of disruptions happening. Such studies use 
methods such as field experiments (Hora and Klassen, 2013), experiments (Tazelaar 
and Snijders, 2013) and simulation (Neiger, Rotaru and Churilov, 2009). Regardless 
of the methodology, the study findings show that disruptions have a negative impact 
on firm performance.  
It is important to make a distinction between disruptions and disruptive 
events. A disruption is an event that temporally interrupts the normal flow of goods at 
one or more stages of the supply chain. Hendricks and Singhal (2003) use actual 
public announcements of business disruptions in their studies. These were identified 
by production delays or shipping delays. In our study we will look at disruptive 
events. For example, a flood in Thailand in 2014 closed over a thousand factories. A 
firm with manufacturing locations in Thailand might or might not be impacted by this 
event. Even more, a factory in the impacted region, could have been prepared and not 
have significant damage while another factory that was less lucky or less prepared 
was impacted more. A factory that did not get flooded, could still be impacted 
because of the difficulty to move goods that a flood poses. Disruptive events are 
events that a firm faces but may not actually interrupt the normal flow of goods of the 
firm’s supply chain. This study looks at events like this one and assumes that if a firm 
had manufacturing locations in the area impacted by the event, then this firm had to 




the firm directly impacting performance. We expect that the probability of having a 
disruption that affects performance increases the more disruptive events a firm faces. 
These events make the supply chain environment more hostile and they posit threats 
for the supply chain that can add up to a significant impact to performance. We posit 
that: 
H3: The higher the frequency of disruptive events a firm has to face 
the lower the performance of the firm will be. 
Conduct 
Traditionally in the SCP framework, conduct refers to the responses that firms 
have to the competitive environment. In our case, we are looking at cultural traits that 
would make a firm stronger at reacting to risk, thus granting it competitive advantage. 
Supply Chain Risk and Supply Chain Risk Management are frequently studied 
together. The literature in Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) has identified 
four stages of SCRM: 1) identification (Neiger et al., 2009; Trkman and McCormack, 
2009), 2) assessment (Ellis et al., 2010; Hendricks and Singhal, 2005), 3) mitigation 
(Jian et al., 2009; Knemeyer et al., 2009) and 4) responsiveness (Kleindorfer and 
Saad, 2005). Supply Chain Risk Management is defined by Manuj and Mentzer 
(2008) as: 
“The identification and evaluation of risks and consequent losses in the global 
supply chain and implementation of appropriate strategies through a 
coordinated approach among supply chain members with the objective of 
reducing one or more of the following – losses, probability, speed of event, 




for supply chain outcomes that, in turn, lead to close matching of actual cost 
savings and profitability with those desired.” 
It is evident from this definition that SCRM involves anticipating and 
managing a potential or actual disruption, from before it happens until its effects are 
over. The SCRM literature has proposed many alternatives in which firms can cope 
with the risks in which they operate. Some examples of risk mitigation strategies 
include: supply chain agility (Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009), flexibility (Seebacker 
and Winkler, 2013), redundancy (Carvalho et al., 2012; Sheffi, 2005), decision 
making process development (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Speier, Whipple, Closs and 
Douglass Voss, 2011), and proactive actions to identify and assess risks (Kleindorfer 
and Saad, 2005; Trkman and McCormack, 2009; Knemeyer et al, 2009). 
Supply chain resilience encompasses all these aspects. It is often considered to 
be a response to the risky environment, and can be seen as complementary to supply 
chain risk management (Mandal, 2012). Sheffi (2005) posits that an effective risk 
management strategy can cultivate a culture of resilience. A firm that has learned to 
cope with the challenges of the environment, and has obtained competitive advantage 
from doing so, will be more capable to cope with new unforeseen challenges, such as 
unpredictable catastrophic events.  
Sheffi (2005), in his book entitled, “The Resilient Enterprise: Overcoming 
Vulnerability for Competitive Advantage”, looks at different types of disruptions to 
the supply chain, and compares how companies impacted by the same disruption 
behaved before, during and after the disruption. He studies, for example, how a fire in 




Ericson. The significant difference in performance for these two firms after the 
disruption was due mostly to the way they managed the disruption from the time it 
took both firms to discover the disruption, to how they assessed the impact, managed 
their suppliers and customers and recovered from the inevitable loss, to the actions 
that were established afterwards to avoid a similar disruption in the future.  
All of these factors point to a “way of doing things”, the organizational culture 
of the firm, that can facilitate the speed and efficient recovery from a disruption. In 
his conclusion, Sheffi points to an organizational culture of resilience as an asset for 
competitive advantage. This implies that a firm is able to utilize its processes, ways of 
communication, knowledge, employees and strategies to figure out how to deal with a 
situation that was not foreseen and had not happened before. The firm has a way to 
acquire new collective experience and knowledge and use it to perform better in the 
future. Sheffi claims that resilience can be an organizational cultural trait that can 
give firms competitive advantage. 
Sheffi’s focus on culture is consistent with the Resource Based View (RBV) 
theory developed by Barney (1986). Barney’s RBV theory claims that the way in 
which a firm utilizes its resources can grant the firm sustainable competitive 
advantage. In order for a resource to bring competitive advantage, it has to be 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (VRIN). Barney (1986) specifically 
addresses the possibility for organizational culture to be a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage. He explains how some cultural traits bring economic value to 
a firm, and that these traits, if also rare and inimitable, can be the source of 




value presented by Barney are: creativity and innovativeness, employee productivity 
and value of worth of employees, customer service and satisfaction. Our study aims 
to understand the link, if any, between supply chain resilience and firm performance. 
We look at resilience factors that constitute cultural traits and the impact of these 
factors on firm performance. 
Organizational culture is a multilevel, complex concept. According to Schein, 
(1986) there are three levels of cultural phenomena in organizations: 1) behaviors and 
physical manifestations, 2) values and 3) basic assumptions. The basic assumptions 
are at the deepest level of the culture, and are the traits that are understood as “correct 
ways” to cope with the environment. This is the most difficult level to measure 
because it is the most taken-for-granted behavior of a culture. In a firm with supply 
chain resilience as part of its basic assumptions, it would be expected for 
manufacturing locations that face potential disruptions to have a business continuity 
plan in case a disruptive event happens. These basic assumptions have measurable 
expressions that we can observe and study. 
Gordon (1991) explains how the environment in which a firm is operating, 
specifically the industry, determines the organizational culture that a firm develops to 
compete in its industry. He states that: “the competitive framework in which a 
company operates is an important dimension on which core assumptions in the 
company culture are developed.” In his conceptual model, he establishes that the 
industry environment (constituted by customer requirements, competitive 
environment and societal expectations) has an impact in the formation of assumptions 




translated into “forms” (constituted by strategies, structures and processes). These 
forms subsequently have an impact on firm performance. Following this reasoning, 
we argue that the current global market environment can trigger a culture of resilience 
that is translated into “forms” that are resilience strategies. For example keeping more 
inventory than necessary in certain locations so that order fulfillment can be 
continued when a location is impacted by a disruptive event. 
We build on Gordon (1991) model, expanding the industry environment to the 
global market environment. Our assumption is that the organizational cultural forms 
of resilience can be captured in business practices, and these can be used to assess 
their impact on firm performance. The assumptions and values of the culture remain 
unmeasurable, and can be considered as inimitable and rare. 
Kamalahmadi and Parast (2016), in their literature review of Supply Chain 
Resilience, defined resiliance as: 
 “The adaptive capability of a supply chain to reduce the probability of 
facing sudden disturbances, resist the spread of disturbances by maintaining 
control over structures and functions, and recover and respond by immediate 
and effective reactive plans to transcend the disturbance and restore the 
supply chain to a robust state of operations.” 
Christopher and Peck (2004) identified principles of supply chain resilience. 
The main four principles are reengineering, collaboration, agility and a culture of 
SCRM. Combining the contributions of Christopher and Peck (2004) with the 
definition of Kalahmadi and Parast (2016), we can say that a culture of SCRM can be 




engineering is identified with the resistance phase and agility is identified with the 
recovery phase. In our theoretical frame, the structure of the environment presents 
risks that in order to develop and maintain competitive advantage, firms develop an 
organizational culture of resilience that allows them to utilize and reorganize 
resources to better serve the needs of the firm according to RBV and enhance 
performance. Consistent with the supply chain resilience literature, RBV and 
organizational culture theory, we propose our fourth hypothesis as the positive impact 
of resilience on firm performance. This hypothesis establishes a link between conduct 
and performance. 
     H4: Supply chain resilience will be positively associated with firm  
performance 
Since resilience is an organizational cultural trait, we divide H4 into three 
parts, for three different indicators of resilience: financial resilience, redundancy in 
the form of inventory and anticipation and recovery in the form of estimated recovery 
time.  
Fiksel et al. (2015) state that financial strength is a resilience factor. A firm 
must be able to absorb fluctuations in cash flow in order to be resilient to disruptions. 
Kamalahmadi and Parast (2016) establish that it is necessary to “recover and respond 
by immediate and effective reactive plans to transcend the disturbance and restore the 
supply chain to a robust state of operations.” For a firm to be able to accomplish this, 
it must have the resources available to absorb the immediate cost that going back to a 





Our assumption is that a firm that is financially solid, would know what kind 
of financial measure to take in specific circumstances (insurance against certain type 
of events, inventory investments, multiple production facilities, etc.). Sheffi (2005) 
gives the example of using insurance when exposed to natural disasters. He says that 
since there are historical statistical data available, insurance companies are able to 
develop reliable statistical predictions, and insurance can be one of the measures to 
build resilience. Such a firm, would know not only how and when to protect from 
potential disruptions but how to invest money in general to increase performance. The 
first indicator of resilience that we look at is the financial solidity of the firm that we 
are calling financial resilience. 
H4a: Financial resilience (financial solidity) will be positively  
associated with firm performance. 
Redundancy and slack have been identified with resilience by multiple studies 
(Hendricks and Singhal, 2009; Blackhurst et al., 2011; Fiksel et al., 2015; 
Kamalahmadi and Parast, 2016). Redundancy is one of the key indicators of re-
engineering (Kalahmadi and Parast, 2016). It allows a firm to rearrange its resources 
to ensure a faster recovery from a disruption while order fulfillment is not interrupted.  
 During the 1980’s and 1990’s, keeping a lean inventory strategy was the main 
trend in many industries. Firms invested in lean manufacturing implementations 
involving inventory analysis, process revisions and design and employee training to 
use new analytical tools. Some firms even combined a lean manufacturing culture 
with a six sigma analytical approach to lean processes in order to improve firm 




2011, put the lean culture to the test. The interruptions in business were especially 
telling for Toyota, in particular, since Toyota is the firm where lean manufacturing 
originated.  
Empirical evidence on inventory shows that total inventory did indeed 
decrease for US manufacturing firms from 1961 to 1994 (Rajagopalan and Malhotra, 
2001). When accounting for the trends in the three types of inventory, raw materials, 
work in progress and finished goods, the study finds that finished goods inventory did 
not decrease as steadily as the others. The results for finished goods varied by 
industry and did not significantly change during the period for more than half of the 
industries in the study. These findings are not completely supportive of the lean 
inventory push. 
Chen et al (2005) examined inventory trends from 1981 to 2000. They found 
that inventory decreased at a rate of 2% per year; but again, finished goods inventory 
did not change.  They found that firms with abnormally high inventory perform 
poorly, while firms with slightly lower than average inventory had good returns. They 
found no evidence for extremely lean inventory providing the best performance. 
Moreover, the lowest level inventory firms performed at about average levels. 
Therefore, empirical research does not provide strong evidence in favor of lean 
inventory policies contributing to better performance. It does seem to provide 
evidence for a “reasonable leanness”; that is, keeping inventory close to the industry 
mean seems to pay off. 
 The supply chain risk management and resilience literature suggests that 




order to reduce the potential impact of unforeseen events. Empirical findings show 
that inventory can effectively mitigate the impact of a disruption on performance. 
Hendricks et al (2009) found that inventory slack mitigates the negative effect of a 
disruption on stock value, using actual disruptions announcements and publicly 
available data. Schmitt and Singh (2012) found through a simulation study involving 
a multi-echelon supply chain that inventory placement can have unforeseen benefits 
in the recovery from a disruption. Liu, et al. (2016) present an analytical model that 
allows a firm to perform a virtual stockpile of inventory to increase resilience and 
avoid excess inventory. The model operates at a network level by targeting a virtual 
transshipment effect that proves to be more cost efficient than simply keeping safety 
stock at a node level.  
While inventory buffers or safety stock have often been considered to be part 
of a supply chain resilience construct (Mandal, 2012; Blackhurst et al., 2011; 
Ambulkar et al., 2015; Carvalho et al., 2012; Park et al., 2016), high levels of 
inventory have been found to be detrimental to firm performance, and are associated 
with inefficiencies. High inventory levels have been associated with lower product 
quality and more product recalls (Steven and Britto, 2016) and lower sales (Ton and 
Raman, 2010). As a result, there are contradictory findings on the benefits of holding 
inventory in the different streams of literature.  
The findings of Chen et al. (2005) provide a path to better understanding this 
contradiction. Their empirical findings indicate that staying close to the industry 
mean on days-of-inventory delivers, on average the best operating performance. 




levels performed better than very lean firms and firms with much greater than average 
inventories. Based on this finding and the findings on redundancy from the supply 
chain resilience literature, we would expect that above the industry mean would be 
where a resilient firm will keep their inventory level. We pose the following 
hypothesis: 
H4b: Higher inventory will be positively associated with firm 
 performance 
Knemeyer et al. (2009) proposes proactive planning and the creation of 
contingency plans as a risk mitigation strategy. Kamalahmadi and Parast (2016) 
identify proactive planning as the first stage of resilience and Blackhurst, Dunn and 
Craighead (2011) find contingency planning to be a resilience enhancer. Therefore, 
we expect that firms that identify potential disruptions and calculate recovery time 
scenarios, will be better performing firms because they have embedded resilience as a 
part of their organizational culture. Hence: 
H4c: Recovery resilience will be positively associated with  
firm performance 
Performance 
In the Supply Chain Resilience literature, resilience has been used as both an 
independent and dependent variable. Studies have examined the impact of resilience 
measures on costs (Liu, Song and Tong, 2016), disruption impact and depth 
(Ambulkar, Blackhurst and Grawe, 2015; Kim, Chen and Linderman, 2015; 
Carvalho, Barroso, Machado, Azevedo, Cruz-Machado, 2012) Other studies have 




reducers of resilience (Christopher and Peck, 2004; Soni, Jain and Kumar, 2014; 
Blackhurst, Dunn and Craighead, 2011).  
While looking at the impact of disruptions, Hendricks and Singhal (2003) 
empirically test the impact of disruptions on firm performance using stock value, 
inventory costs, operational costs and long term stock value as a performance 
measures. They also test the mitigation impact of operational slack that sheds light on 
the impact of resilience.  
There is no study in the literature that empirically tests the impact of risk and 
resilience using a performance variable that encompasses both costs and revenue. In 
this study we are interested in the net effects of our variables on firm performance; 
for this purpose we chose gross margin as the performance measure. Gross margin 
measures the percentage of each dollar of revenue that the firm keeps after 
considering the costs of goods. It is a good measure for the understanding of the 
impact of risks and resilience on firm performance. 
To summarize, Figure 1 shows Gordon’s model published in the Academy of 
Management Review on the top (Gordon, 1991) and a conceptual model of our 






















In this study we combine data from 3 data sources.  
i. Resilinc Data 
Our first data source is from the firm, Resilinc. Resilinc provides supply chain 




track their supply chains, as well as their supplier’s supply chains, identify 
vulnerabilities in the supply chains, design resilient strategies, take mitigating actions 
to reduce vulnerabilities, and receive notification of disruptions using social 
networks, among other services. A Resilinc customer can use the software to map its 
internal supply chain and the supply chain of its suppliers, linking bills of materials to 
component suppliers and the manufacturing locations where these components are 
processed.  
Resilinc keeps track of news through social media notification, and provides 
announcements of potential disruptive events affecting a geographical area. Since the 
locations of a firm are mapped using the Resilinc software tool, the program forwards 
notifications with impact estimations to firm executives according to a notification 
hierarchy established by the firm that is also part of the tool. A customer is able to 
identify vulnerabilities across supply chain tiers, and identify if the firm will be 
impacted by a disruptive event and the potential extent of the impact. The customer 
can also assess the potential risk of its suppliers, its products or the geographical 
regions in which it holds operations.  
Resilinc provided us the population of disruption alerts that were sent during 
the year, 2014. These events are categorized into 4 types: 1) hurricanes, 2) fires, 3) 
earthquakes and 4) other. When a potential disruption is identified, Resilinc sends a 
notification customized for each firm with relevant details such as, the number of 
sites impacted and the potential revenue impact. The customer has the advantage of 




providing the firm visibility into the disruption and the opportunity to recover from 
the disruption. 
For the purposes of identification, the Resilinc customers are referred to as the 
“focal firms”. These are the firms that are making investments in developing 
resilience for their supply chains. For this study, we were also provided with data 
from focal firms’ suppliers for the year, 2014.  Our dataset, therefore, is a cross 
section for the year, 2014 consisting of data related to the supply chains of Reslinc 
customers. The database contains information on both tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers to the 
focal firms.  
The Reslinc service includes identifying “critical” production sites for the 
focal firms. This criticality is most often given by the fact that in those sites critical 
activities that affect high revenue products are performed. Therefore, an interruption 
to these sites could have high revenue impact. For example, these sites are often 
places were single-source activities are taking place. Since these places are linked to 
high revenue impacts, the risk assessment exercise includes business continuity plan 
and recovery time calculations.  
The dataset often contains information on multiple manufacturing locations 
per supplier firm. This information includes: 1) site geographical location (country 
and coordinates), 2) site risk scores (based on country risk scores provided by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit), 3) recovery time (self-reported analysis of disaster 
recovery given in weeks), 4) critical parts that are handled at that location and 5) 
actual potential disruptive events in the year 2014 that affected the geographical area 




We gathered a sample of firms from the Resilinc database that contains all the 
publicly traded firms and their manufacturing locations. We then matched these firms 
to firms in the Compustat database in order to get financial information on the firms. 
A total of 313 firms matched with Compustat. These are linked to 3,262 
manufacturing locations, 75 countries, and 40 industries following a three-digit 
NAICS code.  
Even though the risk scores for each manufacturing location were provided by 
Resilinc, it is important to note that the geopolitical risk scores originated at the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EUI). The EUI provides many services of risk 
assessment using scores from 1 (lowest risk) to 10 (highest risk). In our study, we use 
three of these scores to assess the geographical risk associated with a location: 
Geopolitical Risk, Natural Disaster Risk and Macroeconomic Risk. These are revised 
and updated every three to five years by the EUI, depending on the score and the 
country assessed.  
 
ii. Compustat 
In order to evaluate the effects of risk and resilience on firm performance, we 
use Compustat to obtained data on publicly traded firms. We use the year 2014 to 
calculate the gross margin, days of inventory and the Altman Zscore (a measure of 
financial risk). We use only publicly traded firms from the Resilinc dataset to match 





For the long-term variables, we use 3, 5 and 10 year Compustat industry 
aggregated data. Using a 3-digit NAICS code, we calculate the mean and standard 
deviation of the industry for inventory days of supply and gross margin.  
iii. International Labour Organization (ILO) 
Typically firms choose higher risk environments in order to benefit from 
lower costs of labor. Therefore, to complete our data sample, we use a measure for 
labor costs. The International Labour Organization provides data on minimum wages 
for countries. The minimum wage data is provided as a monthly wage according to 
the most recent laws in the various countries. For this study we use the year of 2012 
and convert all the values to US dollars to allow comparability of costs. The year 
2012 was the most recent year available for data provided by the ILO before 2014. 
iv. Final Database 
We started with over 1,000 firms and 25,000 manufacturing locations 
provided by Resilinc. 325 of the firms were publicly traded, with financial 
information reported in Compustat. 12 firms were eliminated. 4 were duplicates were 
found and deleted and 8 were name mismatches. 313 publicly traded firms were left. 
There are 3,262 sites attached to these firms. Therefore, the 2014 cross sectional 
sample contains 313 firm level observations.  
The data that were originally provided at the manufacturing location level are 
aggregated to create firm level variables. Geopolitical risk, natural disaster risk, 
minimum wage and recovery time are aggregated to the firm level. The total number 
of countries in which sites are located for a firm is a count variable at the firm level. 




impacted each site are also aggregated as a count variable to the firm level. Days of 
inventory, gross margin and the financial resilience variable based on the Altman z 
score are calculated at the firm level using Compustat data. Finally the long term 
variables for days of inventory and gross margin are also calculated at the firm level.  
Hence, the 2014 cross sectional database has 313 firm level observations that 
include: 1) average geopolitical risk, 2) average natural disaster risk, 3) average 
minimum wage, 4) average recovery time, 5) number of countries, 6) number of 
parts, 7) number of events, 8) days of inventory, 9) financial resilience, 10) standard 
deviations from industry mean days of supply over 3, 5 and 10 years; as independent 
variables and gross margin and standard deviations from industry mean gross margin 
over 3,5 and 10 years as dependent variables. This database is divided into sub-sets 
for the purpose of analysis. Details about these groups are discussed with the models. 
v. Missing values 
Some firms failed to provide their recovery time and the number of critical parts 
managed in the site. In order to address these omissions, we use a standard procedure 
for estimating missing values and input the mean value for each of the above 
mentioned firms (Rencher, 2002). 
b. Variables 
i. Environmental Risks 
The environmental risks variables are chosen following the typology 
established by Rao and Goldsby (2009). Environmental risks are external to the firm 
and are related to the firm’s geographical environment. Out of the possibilities listed 




1. Natural Disaster Risk 
The natural disaster risk score ranges from 1 to 10 and measures the 
probability of the geographical region where the manufacturing location is situated 
being hit by a natural disaster (hurricane, tsunami, earthquake, tornado, etc). 10 
represents the highest probability of an event and 1 represents the lowest. This score 
is developed using Resilinc proprietary algorithms and may differ marginally from 
other publish scores since it takes into account different regions within a big country 
such as the United States. A natural disaster can temporarily block the capacity to 
move goods into and out of the country, as well as restrict the capacity to produce due 
to the country’s crisis. This measure is aggregated to the firm level by calculating an 
average between all the sites belonging to the firm. We refer to this variable in short 
form as “Natural”. 
2. Geopolitical Risk 
The geopolitical risk scores range from 1 to 10 and measure the political 
stability of the country where the manufacturing sites are located. 10 represents a 
highly unstable country and 1 represents a very stable country. This score is 
developed and published by the Economist Intelligence Unit using proprietary 
algorithms to determine the probability of a country going through an invasion, a 
change of government, a coup, or experiencing some other kind of political 
instability. Political instability can impact the supply chain by blocking the normal 
flow of goods in the country. Government managed critical points, such as ports and 




measure is assessed at the firm level by calculating an average between all the sites 
belonging to the firm. We refer to this variable in short term as “Geo”. 
ii. Complexity 
We follow the definition of complexity that refers to the size of the network 
and the connectivity between the nodes as per Blackhurst, Dunn and Craighead 
(2011). For each manufacturing site in the Resilinc database, the number of critical 
parts managed for a manufacturing process are indicated. This variable provides a 
count of how many critical parts are processed at the location. The location count s 
are aggregated to the firm level by adding the total critical parts that are managed at 
all sites for the firm. Note that this is not the measure of a firm’s total number of 
critical parts, nor is it a measure of how many nodes there are in the network. It is a 
measure of how many times a critical part must be managed at a location. This 
variable provides an approximation of the complexity of a supply chain. In some 
cases, there may be multiple nodes for a particular critical part.  
iii. Disruptive Events 
In 2014 there over 90 disruptive events tracked by the Resilinc program. 
These events are grouped into 4 categories: Hurricanes, Fires, Earthquakes and Other. 
These events were provided in the data base with the geographical region that was 
impacted. The geographical coordinates of the regions allowed us to link 
manufacturing locations to events.  
Our variable Events, measures how many times a site is impacted by an event. 
This quantity is measured at the firm level by adding all the events of all the sites for 




disruptions in 2014. Note that this is not a measure of the impact that the events had 
on the firm, as it is possible that the site managed the event without interruption. With 
the frequency of disruptive events, we are measuring events that the firm faced, not 
the impact of the events on firm performance. This variable, therefore, is different 
from the disruptions variable used by Hendricks and Singhal (2003) that measured the 
impact of publicly announced disruptions. 
iv. Resilience 
Following the definition of resilience from Kamalahmadi and Parast (2016), 
we establish three measures of resilience for each firm: 
1. Financial Resilience 
Financial resilience is a score from 1 to 10 based on the Altman Z-score. The 
z-score measures how likely it is for a firm to go bankrupt in the next two years. It 
can be used to assess the financial health of a firm. We introduce this score to the 
supply chain resilience literature as a measure of financial solidity. Following Fiksel 
et al, (2015), a financially solid firm would more likely be able to recover and bounce 
back from a disruption than a financially unstable firm. The score is normalized to a 1 
to 10 measure. 10 represents the most financially solid firm and 1 represents the 
weakest firm. We refer to this variable in short form as “finres”. 
2. Inventory 
We use days of inventory as a measure of inventory. Days of inventory 
standardizes the amount of inventory that the firm keeps regardless of firm size or 




turns)*365, where inventory turns is calculated as: Cost of Goods Sold / ((Beginning 
Inventory + Ending Inventory) / 2). We refer to this variable in short form as “DOI”. 
3. Recovery Resilience 
Recovery Resilience is adjusted to range from -10 to -1. Each site in the 
Resilinc database may report the time it would take to return to operations after the 
site has been shut down due to a disruption. Therefore, the variable does not measure 
actual recovery time, but projected recovery time following a disaster. An analysis of 
the impact of a disaster is conducted at a site, and an estimate of how long it would to 
return to regular operations is calculated. This time was reported originally in weeks 
and converted into a score from 1 to 10. The sign is inverted such that the higher the 
recovery resilience, the faster the site will recover. This adjustment is made to aid in 
interpreting the regression models. The fastest recovery is represented by -1 and 
slowest recovery is represented by -10. Then the site measures are assessed at the 
firm level by averaging the recovery resilience scores of all the sites belonging to a 
firm. We refer to this variable in short form as “RecRes”. 
v. Performance 
The dependent variable for this study is gross margin, a measure of firm 
performance. Gross margin allows us to understand how much per dollar of revenue a 
firm retains after the costs of production. Gross margin is calculated by subtracting 
the cost of goods sold from the total revenue and dividing it by total revenue. We use 
the short form “gmargin” for this variable. 
The dependent variable for the long term effects models is also based on gross 




below the industry mean gross margin. To calculate this variable the mean gross 
margins over 3, 5 and 10 years of the 3 digit NAICS code industry were calculated, 
along with corresponding standard deviations. The firm’s average gross margin over 
those years was calculated as well. Then the following calculation is used: (firm 
average gross margin – industry mean gross margin)/industry gross margin standard 
deviation. We call these variables gmarginsd3, gmarginsd5 and gmarginsd10. 
vi. Controls 
Since the cost of labor is a major reason for operating in a country, we control 
for labor cost. We use the minimum wage reported for the country in which the site is 
located by the International Labor Organization for 2012. This amount is converted to 
dollars. This measure is assessed by an average at the firm level. We use the short 
name “mwage” for this variable. 
We have established through the literature that globalization has an impact on 
firm operations and that this can impact the firm’s performance. We control for 
spatial complexity per Bode and Wagner (2015) as the number of countries in which 
a firm operates.  
Finally, we control for industry effects through the model. The model adjusts 
the standard errors by clustering the firms by industry. We control for firm size by 
choosing the dependent variable to be a ratio, instead of Total Revenue or some other 
size-specific measure of firm performance. 









 In order to test our hypotheses we use a linear regression model with industry 
clusters. The general equation for all our models is: 
 
grossmargin = α1*(natural disaster) + α2*(geopolitical) + α3*(CritParts) +  
  α4*(Events) + α5*(finresilience) + α6*(DOI) + α7*(resilience)  +  
  (controls) ………………………………………………(Equation 1) 
 
We estimate a robust clustered model using the Stata software package. This 
model controls for industry effects by adjusting the standard errors by industry 
clusters.  
i. Short Term Models (1,2,3) 
Variable Name Source Description
Geopolitical Risk EIU
the degree to which political institutions are sufficiently 
stable to support the needs of businesses and investors 
Natural Disaster Risk Resilinc Probability of a natural disaster occurring in the region.
Recovery Resilience Resilinc
How long it takes to go back to “normal” on an activity that 
has been disrupted. Calculated: ( -10*recovery time/52)
Min Wage ILO Min monthly wage for the country. (2012 USD)
Countries Resilinc Number of countries the firm has operations in
Critical Parts Resilinc Number of critical parts the firm is monitoring
Financial Resilience Compustat
Altman Z score, measure of likelihood that the firm will go 
bankrupt in the next 2 years. Calculated
Events Resilinc Number of potential disruptions a firm had in 2014
DOI Compustat Days of Inventory. (1/inv turns)*365
Gross Margin Compustat (Total Revenue – COGS)/Total Revenue
DOI SDS Compustat
Number of standard deviations firm mean is below industry 
mean (Neg. No.) or above industry mean (Pos. No.)
Gross Margin SDS Compustat
Number of standard deviations firm mean is below industry 




The final database contains 313 firm level observations. Out of these 313, 156 
contain data for the recovery time and 157 do not. The same 156 firms with recovery 
time data also have data on critical parts.  
In order to obtain robust results, we divide the database into three groups. The 
first group is named ALL and it contains all 313 firms. For the firms that are missing 
the recovery time and critical parts data, the mean values are assigned. Group 1 is 
constituted by the firms that do have recovery time and critical parts information, in 
order words, the firms with a resilience culture. Group 2 is constituted by the firms 
that do not have this information, in other words the firms without a culture of 
resilience. In this way, we can compare the results from all three groups. Model 1 is 
the regression ran with the group named All that contains all 313 firms. Model 2 
corresponds to Group1 and Model 3 corresponds to Group 2. These three models use 
the cross-sectional data for 2014. 
ii. Long Term Models (4,5,6) 
Shein (1985), Barney (1986) and Gordon (1991) state that it is difficult to 
change culture because the deepest level of assumptions generate behaviors that are 
“automatic”, making them difficult to recognize and change. They all agree that if it 
is possible to change culture, it takes a long time. Working on this assumption, we 
would test our resilience variables over time.  
Model 4 corresponds to the group All, using the 10-year standard deviations 
from the industry mean gross margin variable as a dependent variable. Model 5 and 






Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables for the three groups in 
the models: the total sample, the group that provided recovery estimates and that 
group that did not. Note that this table suggests that Group 1 and Group 2 might be 







Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
All Group 1 Group 2
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Min Max
Countries 313 4 4.820 1 42.000 156 6 5.639 1 42 157 3 3.253 1 22
Sites 313 24 165.863 1 2,922.000 156 42 233.758 1 2,922 157 6 9.637 1 78
CritParts 313 209 1039.636 0 14,153.000 156 419 1,444.626 0 14,153
Geo 313 3.005 1.077 1 6.5 156 3.248 0.958 1.667 6 157 2.764 1.136 1 6.5
Natural 313 3.709 1.490 1 9 156 4.140 1.384 1 9 157 3.281 1.472 1 9
finres 229 0.741 1.992 -9.563 10 122 0.807 2.513 -9.563 10 107 0.666 1.146 -4.197 5.167
DOI 301 92.146 70.765 0.652 567.778 154 84.261 54.355 0.652 398.897 147 100.406 84.021 1.692 567.778
mwage 306 927.149 332.343 42.557 1,565.885 156 849.413 302.673 177.625 1,565.885 150 1007.995 343.346 42.557 1,565.885
events 313 10 16.154 0 109 156 16 20.304 0 109 157 4 6.694 0 42
RecRes 156 -6.960 3.212 -10 -0.192308 156 -6.960 3.212 -10 -0.192
DOIstds10 262 -0.275 0.565 -1.143 2.996 142 -0.350 0.445 -1.143 1.591 120 -0.186 0.672 -1.066 2.996
gmargin 308 0.371 0.194 0.007 0.937 155 0.386 0.191 0.032 0.814 153 0.356 0.198 0.007 0.937
gmarginstds10 262 -0.026 0.873 -5.230 2.907 142 0.057 0.880 -1.870 2.907 120 -0.125 0.858 -5.230 1.522
Table 3: Correlations table
Countries TotalParts Geo Natural finres DOI mwage events RecRes1 DOIstds gmargin
Countries 1
CritParts 0.32 1
Geo 0.17 0.14 1
Natural 0.03 0.08 0.57 1
finres -0.05 0.07 -0.10 -0.06 1
DOI 0.02 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.25 1
mwage -0.14 -0.15 -0.87 -0.79 0.06 -0.07 1
events 0.72 0.19 0.25 0.30 -0.09 0.15 -0.27 1
RecRes1 -0.15 0.04 -0.06 -0.20 -0.02 0.02 0.10 -0.12 1
DOIsds -0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.16 0.20 0.82 -0.04 0.12 0.02 1
gmargin -0.09 -0.15 0.01 0.29 0.30 0.49 -0.10 0.19 -0.02 0.44 1





Note that there are high correlation between some of the independent 
variables. Events has a 0.72 correlation coefficient with Countries. This is to be 
expected since the higher the number of countries, the higher the events frequency. 
The Natural Disaster risk and the Geopolitical risk also have a high correlation with a 
coefficient of 0.57. We decided to keep both variables in all our models because these 
two risk scores provide different information that is relevant to our study.  
i. Difference of means test 
Before testing the hypotheses, we ran a difference of means test for all the 
variables in Group 1 and Group 2. First, we want to understand if these groups are 
statistically different. Table 4 summarizes the results for the means tests. As can be 
seen in the table, these two groups are statistically different in the environmental risk 
variables. Group 1 has a higher mean for both Natural Disaster risk and Geopolitical 
Risk than Group 2. In addition, the firms in Group 1 have operations in more 
countries and experience more disruptive events, on average. This result suggests that 
the firms in Group 1 operate in a riskier environment or have a higher propensity 
towards risk. These firms seem to be risk seekers.  
Interestingly, there is no statistical difference between the two groups when it 
comes to size (employees), revenue, gross margin in the year 2014 and financial 
resilience indicating that the firms are not differentiated by financial success or size. 
However, the firms in Group 1 seem to keep lower inventory levels than the firms in 




processes than the firms in Group 2. Recall we divided the sample using the recovery 
process and the critical parts tracking process as a differentiator.  
The only variable that is significant with a higher mean for Group 2, is 
inventory. This result could suggest that the firms in Group 2 cope with their risks by 
keeping higher levels of inventory. It could also be evidence of a combination of lean 
and resilience, as suggested by Harrington (2013). She revisits lean culture and 
suggests that it should be combined with a culture of resilience to maximize 
performance. Lastly, the measure for the distance of gross margin from the industry 
mean over ten years, is significantly higher at the 5% level for Group 1 suggesting 













ii. Regression Results for Short Term Models (1,2,3) 
Table 4: Difference of Means Tests Summary
Group 1 Group 2
Mean Mean G1>G2 G1 ≠ G2 G1<G2
Geo 3.25 2.76 *** ***
Natural 4.14 3.28 *** ***
finres N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
DOI 84.26 100.41 ** **
events 15.85 4.25 *** ***
Countries 5.80 2.88 *** ***
gmargin N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
gmarginsds10 0.06 -0.13 ** *
Revenue N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Employees N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A





Table 5 shows the regression results for all six models. Geopolitical risk is 
not significant in any of the models, while natural disaster risk is only marginally 
significant in Model 1 but strongly significant in Model 2 with the expected sign, 
and not significant at all for Model 3. Therefore, we find partial support for H1. 
The complexity (critical parts) results for Models 1 and 2 are strongly significant 
with a negative sign for both models. Model 3 has no information on this variable. 
This result is consistent with findings in the literature. The surprising result is for 
disruptive events frequency. It is strongly significant but with the opposite sign 
from what was expected for Models 1 and 2 and not significant for Model 3. This 
result is contrary to expectations. We had hypothesized in H3 that more events 
would contribute to lower performance, however find contrary results. This 
finding may indicate that firms that more frequently face disruptions have learned 
how to manage these disruptions such that they do not impact performance. The 
fact that the sign is positive, indicates that for the firms in Group 1 there may be 
an argument for a resilient culture, since the results indicate that more events lead 
to higher gross margin. This finding is consistent with Sheffi (2005) and Fiksel 
(2015) who suggest that much can be learned about resilience from firms that 
operate in highly disruptive industries, such as fashion and technology.  
For H4, the expected positive sign for financial resilience lends strongl 
support in all three models for our hypotheses. The days of inventory results 
follow the same structure as the financial resilience results providing strong 




In order to obtain a general understanding of the effect of recovery 
resilience, Model 1 contains all the firms. The recovery resilience variables for the 
firms in Group 2 are assigned average values. We see that the coefficient for 
resilience is marginally significant at the 10% level, with the expected positive 
sign. The results for Model 2 are stronger, with a significance level of 5%, 
indicating that for the firms in Group 1 faster recovery is associated with higher 
gross margins. It is interesting to note that this is a theoretical recovery variable; 




iii. Regression Results for Long Term Models (4,5,6) 
Table 5 also shows the results for Models 4, 5 and 6. In the long term effects 
we can see that complexity remains consistently significant with a negative sign, 
while none of the risk variables is significant. Financial resilience is significant for 
Table 5: Regression Results
DV = Gross Margin SDS (10 years)
DV = Gross Margin
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
ALL Group 1 Group 2 ALL Group 1 Group 2
CritParts -0.000026 *** -0.000026 *** -0.000140 *** -0.000136 ***
Geo -0.0199 -0.0320 0.0129 -0.1592 -0.1889 -0.0576
Natural 0.0295 * 0.0495 *** 0.0124 0.0822 0.0909 -0.0034
finres 0.0224 *** 0.0193 *** 0.0251 *** 0.1210 *** 0.1113 *** 0.0432
DOI/DOIsds 0.0014 *** 0.0017 *** 0.0011 *** 0.4829 *** 0.8699 *** 0.3019 **
RecRes 0.0022 * 0.0031 ** 0.0214 ** 0.0171 **
events 0.0036 *** 0.0030 *** 0.0047 0.0140 *** 0.0120 *** 0.0193
mwage -0.000019 0.000021 0.0000 -0.000375 -0.000145 -0.000424
Countries -0.0074 ** -0.0068 *** -0.0072 -0.0290 -0.0315 ** -0.0260
_cons 0.2363 0.1533 0.1150 0.7561 0.8534 0.4936
N 214 122 96 203 117 86
R2 0.3604 0.4736 0.2424 0.2362 0.4334 0.058
industries 28 17 23 14 12 13




models 4 and 5 but not for model 6. Days of inventory is consistent for the 6 models. 
It is in fact the only key variable with significance in Model 6, with a positive sign 
and a 5% significance level. Therefore, for Group 2, the only variable that has some 
explanatory power is DOI. Long term recovery resilience is also consistent with the 
short term results.  
iv. Model 7: Events 
Based on the results from Models 1 through 6, we added another model. The 
events reported in the database are categorized as 1) hurricanes, 2) fires, 3) 
earthquakes and 4) other. In an attempt to better understand the positive sign obtained 
for H3, we ran the model again. However, instead of using a total events count, we 
used a count for all 4 categories.  
The results for this model show that Hurricanes has a positive and significant 
coefficient while Other has a negative and significant (10%) coefficient. The results 
for fires and earthquakes are not significant. We believe that this is because there are 
not enough events in these two groups. There are 67 total events out of which 21 are 
hurricanes and 32 are “Other”, with 5 fires and 9 earthquakes. The events in the Other 
category may be more unpredictable. Some examples of these are: “European 
financial crisis”, “Flooding in Thailand shuts down over 1,000 factories”, “Winter 
storm “Nemo” potential impact projection” and “Escalating conflict in Israel”.  
On the other hand, hurricanes are fairly predictable events. Countries in the 
hurricane zone have been coping with hurricanes for years. The hurricane season 
covers the same months every year. Therefore, out of all the types of disruptions a 




develop a resilient culture around them. This is consistent with Sheffi (2005) who 
stated that statistical data for some natural disasters can be precise, and that insurance 
companies have developed very accurate prediction models for these events. Results 




DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results provide empirical evidence that resilience has a positive impact on 
performance. The results also provide more interesting insight, that not all resilience 
strategies are equal.  























Group 1 has a higher risk environment in terms of geographical risk, network 
size, complexity and global reach. For these firms, it is significant to have resilience 
strategies put in place. Financial solidity, redundancy in inventory and business 
continuity planning all come out strongly significant and positive in predicting 
profitability. This group also has more potential disruptions, but these frequency 
seems to be identified with better performance, suggesting that firms that operate in 
these environments become stronger and gain competitive advantage. We intuit that 
this unexpected result is because the environment is triggering an organizational 
culture that is ready to face potential disruptions. This finding is consistent with 
Sheffi (2015) who argues that resilience may result in benefits to a firm. To develop a 
culture of resilience is beneficial for the firm in everyday business challenges, while 
insurance only protects the firm from specific pre-considered scenarios.  
These results are also consistent with Fiksel (2015) who states that since 
resilience is a monetary investment, firms have to understand what they need. It 
would be a waste of money to have unnecessary built-in flexibility for example. 
Ambulkar et al, (2015) concluded that firms need to learn from disruptions to develop 
resiliency. Park et al, (2016) addresses the issue from a risk-taking perspective. They 
find that firms that tend towards higher risk-taking also tend to develop more security 
measures and safety compliance. Our findings support this result, and we recognize 
that more research is necessary to better understand the internal dynamics of these 
relationships.  
 The results for days of inventory seem to suggest that the first level of 




documented in the literature. This tradeoff is due to the costs of resilience and the 
pressure for leaner and more efficient operations (Fiksel, 2015). However, Tang 
(2006) proposes that the resilient firm should also be efficient. Our findings indicate 
that it is good for a firm to keep a higher inventory, but we do not think this result is 
contrary to the lean manufacturing literature. We cannot, based on our findings, argue 
that limitless inventory would mean higher performance. We can, however argue that 
there is evidence for resilient measures, specifically inventory and that a deeper study 
that focuses on inventory strategies is necessary to resolve the conflict in the 
literature.  
 Geopolitical risk was not significant in all the models. We think this finding 
might be partially due to high correlations between geopolitical risk and labor costs. 
We also think that this particular risk is very difficult to assess, since it is possible for 
a country to be high risk in political stability but not cause a disruption for years. In 
this case, firms could benefit from the lower costs that this country offers for a long 
time before there is a geopolitically-motivated disruption. On the other hand, natural 
disaster risk provides a more accurate risk to estimate, because the score can be based 
on statistical data instead of perception. 
 Based on our results, we reach the following conclusions: 1) In order to 
operate in a global market, firms that develop a culture of resilience can obtain higher 
performance. 2) The depth of the resilience necessary to gain competitive advantage 
depends on the level of risk that the firm faces. 3) Environments that present 




learning experiences and training for other unexpected events. Firms can acquire 
useful knowledge on how to operate at these sites. 
 Managers should be aware of these findings when planning how to cope with 
potential disruptions. It is important for managers to understand the potential 
disruptions they face and assess the actions necessary to cope with the environment 
without investing too much money into unnecessary measures, on the contrary, too 






APPENDIX A: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 In order to check our results, we ran some alternative models taking into 
consideration the high correlations between some independent variables and possible 
endogeneity. Days of inventory and gross margin are endogenous variable. To check 
our results considering this issue we ran some models lagging the days of inventory 
variable. We also ran a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model following the 
models for gross margin and days of inventory in Moser et al (2017). The SUR model 
assumes correlation between the standard errors of the two equations and estimates 
the coefficients and standard errors according to this assumption. 
 We also ran models using different variables to control for size. We use 
Employees and revenue in different models. Model 9 uses a log transformation of 
Employees to compensate for the distribution of this variable. Since the variable that 
explains the most a year’s gross margin is the gross margin of the previous year, we 
show some models with a lagged gross margin variable. These models significantly 
increase the value of R2.  
 There are high correlations between minimum wage and the risks scores and 
between Countries and events variables. We check for multicollinearity using a VIF 
test. All values are within the acceptable threshold of 10, but we also ran some 
models omitting correlated variables. Nine alternative models are shown below. As 
can be seen, the different models change significance levels for some variables. The 
results for the risks and the resilience variables do not change signs when they are 
significant. Finres, events and DOI show stable results. Model 9 with lagged DOI and 




paper. The SUR model shows consistent results for natural disasters risk, financial 
resilience, disruptive events and days of inventory. We also show below VIF results 
and added variable plots for model 9. The plots show no distinguishable patterns for 
any of the variables except DOI that has a slight linear tendency towards gross 
margin. 
 We tested model 9 to see if it fulfills OLS normality assumption. The graph is 
shown below and it can be seen in Figure 3 that the distribution of the residuals 
approximates a normal distribution. We also performed a Jarque-Bera test for 
normality. The Chi Square value gives 8.546 while the JB value is 0.0139. Since 
0.0139 < 8.546 the null hypothesis of normality cannot be rejected. This test validates 
the results obtained using an OLS regression.  
For long term models we also ran models using variables for 3 and 5 years. 
The results for these models are also shown below. Results do not change 










Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Crit Parts -0.00002 ***
Geo -0.0314 -0.0354 -0.0280 -0.0219 -0.0034 -0.0035 -0.0391 -0.0339 -0.0244
Natural 0.0154 0.0251 0.0272 * 0.0310 * 0.0025 0.0027 0.0286 * 0.0156 0.0216 *
finres 0.0176 *** 0.0178 *** 0.0182 *** 0.0186 *** -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0195 *** 0.0182 *** 0.0206 ***
DOI 0.0015 *** 0.0015 *** 0.0015 *** 0.0014 *** 0.0015 ***
RecRes 0.0322 0.0290 0.0305 * 0.0289 0.0117 *** 0.0116 *** 0.0397 *** 0.0382 * 0.0376 **
events 0.0038 *** 0.0014 0.0014 0.0013 0.0003 0.0002 *** 0.0016 0.0037 *** 0.0038 ***
mwage -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00002 0.00000 0.00001 0.00001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00003
Countries -0.0102 *** -0.0003 -0.0082 ** -0.0089
Employees -0.0005 *** -0.0118 **
Revenue -0.000001 ***
lag GM 0.9640 *** 0.9653 ***
lag DOI 0.00004 0.00004 0.0015 *** 0.0012 ***
_cons 0.3318 0.2685 0.2179 0.1770 -0.0035 -0.0058 0.2630 0.3418 0.2807
N 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 213
R2 0.35 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.98 0.98 0.35 0.37 0.39
industries 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28





































DV = Gross Margin (3yrs) DV = Gross Margin (5yrs) DV = Gross Margin (10yrs)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ALL Group 1 Group 2 ALL Group 1 Group 2 ALL Group 1 Group 2
RecRes = Yes RecRes = No RecRes = Yes RecRes = No RecRes = Yes RecRes = No
CritParts -0.000146 *** -0.000148 *** -0.000133 *** -0.000141 *** -0.000140 *** -0.000136 ***
Geo -0.2351 -0.2533 -0.1773 -0.1991 -0.2043 -0.1057 -0.1592 -0.1889 -0.0576
Natural 0.0288 0.1259 -0.0275 0.0448 0.1517 * -0.0184 0.0822 0.0909 -0.0034
finres 0.1096 *** 0.1034 *** 0.0858 * 0.1121 *** 0.1028 *** 0.0735 0.1210 *** 0.1113 *** 0.0432
DOIsds 0.5572 *** 0.6972 ** 0.4501 ** 0.4610 *** 0.6859 *** 0.3089 * 0.4829 *** 0.8699 *** 0.3019 **
RecRes 0.1936 *** 0.0179 * 0.1897 *** 0.0210 ** 0.0214 ** 0.0171 **
events 0.0150 *** 0.0138 *** 0.0191 0.0158 *** 0.0138 *** 0.0152 0.0140 *** 0.0120 *** 0.0193
mwage -0.000505 -0.000103 -0.0006 -0.000413 0.000016 -0.0004 -0.000375 -0.000145 -0.000424
Countries -0.0414 ** -0.0372 *** -0.0423 -0.0441 ** -0.0360 ** -0.0417 -0.0290 -0.0315 ** -0.0260
_cons 1.1839 0.8795 1.3217 0.8760 0.5067 0.8263 0.7561 0.8534 0.4936
N 203 117 86 203 117 86 203 117 86
R2 0.32 0.41 0.18 0.27 0.39 0.10 0.2362 0.4334 0.058




Chapter 3: The impact of Internal and External Disruptive 
Events on Supply Chain Resilience Strategies 
ABSTRACT 
This research study seeks to understand the impact of supply chain disruptive 
events on a firm’s supply chain resilience strategies. We look at two resilience 
strategies: business continuity planning and recovery time. We use a sample of 159 
publicly traded firms and external and internal risks and disruptive events in the year 
2014 to test our hypotheses. Our findings indicate that external disruptive events 
increase the probability of a firm developing a business continuity strategy while 
internal disruptive events might not. However, once the business continuity strategy 
has been put in place, internal disruptive events are associated with faster recovery. 
Our findings also show that firms operating in riskier environments tend to be more 
likely to have business continuity plans in place. External risks are associated with 





The year 2017 was a very active year for hurricanes. Hurricane Harvey 
devastated Houston in August 2017, hurricane Irma struck the Caribbean at the 
beginning of September and hurricane María destroyed Puerto Rico, leaving the 
entire island without power for weeks, on September 20th. Natural disasters interrupt 
normality for countries, governments need to assess the situation and ensure the 
safety of the people to reduce fatalities and to ensure that needed services like health 
care services are reinitiated as soon as possible after the storm has passed. But not 
only governments are involved, disasters have a strong impact on business and due to 
the global economy we live in, a disaster in one country can easily have a global 
impact.  
In the past decade firms have become more aware of supply chain disruptions 
and supply chain risks. Researchers have looked at the identification and definitions 
of risks (Ritchie and Marshall, 1993), the impact of supply chain risks on 
performance (Wagner and Bode, 2008) and possible strategies to mitigate the risks 
(Christopher and Peck, 2004). Supply chain resilience has been identified as one of 
the most beneficial mitigation strategies. Sheffi (2005) in his case studies of supply 
chain disruptions investigation, concludes that a culture of supply chain resilience is 
more beneficial to the firm than a strategy of solely hedging through insurance for 
example, because the insurance protects against very specific damages while 




unexpected disruptions that insurance would not cover because they are 
unpredictable.  
Our study seeks to understand better the relationship between disruptive 
events and supply chain resilience strategies. It is important to make a distinction 
between supply disruptions and disruptive events. A disruption is an event that 
interrupted the normal flow of materials at a firm level and impacted the firm. 
Hendricks and Singhal (2003) identified disruptions through public announcements of 
issues with delivery and production. Disruptive events are events that could 
potentially cause disruptions but that did not necessarily became an issue to the firm. 
Every year there are hurricanes during the hurricane season, for example, but not all 
of them become a disruption for firms or an entire industry like hurricane María did 
in 2017. Hurricane María impacted the pharmaceutical and medical devices industries 
by paralyzing production in Puerto Rico for weeks.  
These disruptive events can be internal or external. Product recalls are events 
that are not caused by the geographical environment that the firm is operating in, but 
by the nature of a product and the internal organization dynamics of how the product 
is designed and managed. Although recalls are a public announcement for the firm 
according to regulations in the United States, depending on the severity of the reason 
for the recall they might not necessarily become a firm level disruption.  
Our study looks at two types of disruptive events, internal and external to the 
firm and seeks to understand the impact these events have on the firm’s supply chain 




continuity plan and the projected average time it would take a firm to recover from 
supply chain disruptions.  
 
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Supply chain resilience has become an important topic for both researchers 
and practitioners over the past decade. In their literature review, Kamalahdi and 
Parast (2016) found academic research activity on supply chain resilience since 2001.  
Moreover, they note a tremendous surge in resilience research since 2011 following 
the Japan tsunami of 2009, given the attention to resilience in the news due to the 
great disruptions the tsunami caused the automotive industry.  
One of the contributions of Kamalahdi and Parast was to propose a 
comprehensive definition of supply chain resilience, which is the definition we use 
for our study: 
“Supply chain resilience is the adaptive capability of a supply chain to reduce 
the probability of facing sudden disturbances, resist the spread of 
disturbances by maintaining control over structures and functions, and 
recover and respond by immediate and effective reactive plans to transcend 
the disturbance and restore the supply chain to a robust state of operations.” 
This definition clearly defines three phases of resilience: anticipation or 
proactive planning, resistance to the spread of disturbances after the event, and 




and Parast to shape our investigation. Disruptions to the supply chain can be very 
costly to a firm. In his book, The Resilient Enterprise, Yossi Sheffi (2005) explores 
different kinds of disruptions, from a fire at a particular plant, to natural disasters and 
terrorist attacks. He sheds light on the vulnerabilities of the supply chain, and the 
monetary impact they can have towards the performance of the firm. He also shows 
how different resilience strategies can help control a disruption as it is happening, and 
can help the firm to recover faster and return to a “business as usual” state. Planning 
strategies, redundancy in inventory, capacity flexibility, redundancy in suppliers, 
clear communications, visibility and manufacturing postponement, are some of the 
strategies that he examines. Sheffi concludes that organizational culture is critical to 
surviving and managing disruptions; specifically a culture of resilience will put a firm 
in the best condition to survive a major disruption and even gain competitive 
advantage after the disruption. 
Empirical evidence shows, for example, that operational slack strategies, such 
as inventory slack and capacity slack, mitigate the impact of supply chain disruptions 
on a firm (Hendricks et al., 2009). However, in the absence of disruptions, investment 
in slack resources can represent an additional cost to the firm that can be detrimental 
to the firm’s performance (Fiksel, 2015).  A resilient firm should be able to determine 
how much slack to build in the various parts of its supply chain processes, given that 
building resilient strategies represents a real cost to the firm (Sheffi, 2005). It should 
be recognized that resilience is important to firms because it not only can give them a 




better performance due to improved processes, better communication, more visibility 
and clearer decision-making paths (Sheffi, 2005). 
In this study we are interested in studying how the impact of supply chain 
risks and potential disruptions affects supply chain resilience. Specifically, we test the 
impact of environmental risks and disruptive events, and internal (organizational) 
risks, on two resilience strategies: having a culture of risk management and agility. 
We argue that firms operating in risky environments will be more likely to have 
embraced supply chain resilience culture and strategies. 
Supply Chain Resilience Strategies 
Christopher and Peck, (2004) introduced four concepts of supply chain 
resilience that are known as the “four pillars of resilience”: Supply chain risk 
management culture, agility, collaboration and re-engineering. Most of the strategies 
in the supply chain resilience literature are associated with at least one of these 
concepts.  
i. Supply Chain Risk Management Culture: Business Continuity Planning 
Supply chain risk management involves establishing ways to identify risks, 
understanding the probability and the potential impact of supply chain disruptions, 
and identifying ways to prevent their impact.  With proper risk management, a firm 
can make decisions about the investments necessary to put preventive strategies in 
place.  
The first step in risk management is to understand the uncertainties that the 




reason, a part of the supply chain risk management literature is dedicated to 
identifying risks and proposing how to make a risk assessment. Tang (2006) presents 
a thorough examination of the uncertainties faced in a supply chain, and the possible 
strategies that may be implemented in case a disruption happens. The risks listed are 
(internal) operational risks, and the solutions discussed help overcome these 
disruptions. Manuj and Mentzer (2008) propose a risk management model to assess 
risks and make decisions about risk management strategies in a global supply chain. 
In a similar manner, Neiger et al (2009) propose an engineering process to identify 
risks, considering the complexity of the global supply chain. Sheffi (2005) discusses 
the importance of proactive planning in his book about resilience in supply chain. 
Knemeyer et al (2009) identified risk analysis tools from the insurance industry to 
develop a process to help a firm plan for a catastrophic event. To facilitate proactive 
planning, studies focus on classifying risks to help match risks to management 
strategies. For example, Rao and Goldsby (2009) develop a typology of supply chain 
risks, defining five main risk factors: environmental risk, industry risk, organizational 
risk, problem-specific risk and decision-maker risk. In this study we refer to this 
typology to classify supply chain risk exposure. We focus our attention on the 
framework factors: environmental, industry and organizational risks. 
Recent empirical studies on risk assessment focus on understanding the 
impact of doing business under various circumstances, and how these circumstances 
may impact different aspects of performance. Wagner and Bode (2008) conduct a 
survey to see the impact of supply chain risk on supply chain performance. They 




and demand risk and supply chain performance. These studies help managers and 
researchers understand why it is important to embed risk assessment tools into the 
supply chain processes and decision making.  
The presence of a risk management culture has been empirically found to be 
an enabler of resilience (Soni et al, 2014), an antecedent of resilience (Mandal, 2012), 
and a driver of resilience (Ambulkar et al, 2015). Christopher and Peck (2004) define 
risk management culture by three main traits. 1) Presence of a supply chain 
representative in the leadership team, 2) Formal risk assessment processes for 
decision making, 3) Presence of metrics and routine reviews of risks. Once risks are 
assessed, strategies can be developed to mitigate exposure to the risks identified.  
An overall risk reduction strategy for practitioners is known as business 
continuity planning (BCP). According to the American Production and Inventory 
Control Society’s (APICS) Dictionary, (2005), business continuity planning refers to 
a set of “plans to ensure that an organization is capable of continuing to deliver 
products or services at acceptable predefined levels following a disruptive event”. 
The presence of a business continuity plan implies that threats have been identified 
and evaluated, and that what is needed to recover in the case of an event has been 
organized and documented so that it can be put in place when a disruption happens. A 
BCP is a thorough exercise in risk assessment. The supply chain risk management 
literature has identified the presence of a risk assessment exercise, such as BCP, as an 
acceptable indicator of the presence of a risk management culture in multiple survey 




2015). Having a business continuity plan is a good indicator of a risk management 
and resilience culture. 
Our first group of hypotheses will examine the impact of two types of supply 
chain risks and disruptive events on the probability of a firm having a risk 
management culture as indicated through the presence of a business continuity plan. 
A risk management culture is an indicator of a resilience culture (Kalahmadi and 
Parast, 2016). The presence of a BCP across locations in a firm indicates that the 
leadership is involved in promoting SCRM culture, it is in itself a formal process and 
for our study it indicates that firms are being evaluated through it. We feel confident 
this can be generalized to the current global market environment. 
Environmental risks are risks that include political instability, natural disaster 
threat, macroeconomic risk and policy changes (Rao and Goldsby, 2009). These risks 
are external to the firm and are a consequence of having manufacturing locations in 
places threaten by the environment. Firms choose such countries because they 
typically bring significant cost advantages. Lower cost of labor, lower cost of keeping 
and handling inventory, lower cost of infrastructure, etc. Holweg et al (2011) showed 
that firms still use an accounting based process to make decisions about 
manufacturing locations. These processes emphasize the cost advantages of certain 
countries. Although they conclude that firms should include the environmental risks 
in their decision making analysis in order to avoid entering into these environments, 
we argue that operating in risky environments can trigger a learning process in firms 
that would result in developing a culture of supply chain resilience. A firm that 




that operating in a risky country bring and would also take advantage of the learning 
experience that operating in a risky environment can bring. For the purpose of this 
study, we combine political instability, natural disaster risk and macroeconomic risk 
into one measurement of geographical location risk. We pose that a risky external 
environment will motivate a firm to develop a resilience culture expressed in the form 
of having a BCP in place: 
H1: The more a firm has identified exposure to external environmental risks 
the more likely it will be to have a business continuity plan development 
process. 
The second type of risk we want to look at is internal risk. Per Rao and 
Goldsby (2009) these could be organizational or industry risks. Organizational risks 
are firm-specific risks and industry risks are risks that are posed by the industry such 
as competitive dynamics, input market and product market. Our study looks at supply 
chain network complexity as a risk source.  Requiring a supply chain network with 
many nodes (production sites) or many components (product complexity) may be due 
to a combination of firm-specific factors and industry-factors. Having many 
components to keep track of makes the supply chain more complex by increasing the 
number of supplier a firm has, probably increasing the number of tiers for production 
if the product has a complex design and increasing the number of nodes. Having 
many components could indicate an internal/organizational cultural trait of how the 
firm designs its products or an industrial trait of the nature of the product being 
complex and having many components. It could also be due to product variety, which 




us to distinguish organizational risks from industry risks that is why we combine 
them to establish our hypothesis.  Following the typology of Rao and Goldsby (2009), 
we classify supply chain complexity as an industry-organizational risk.  
Supply chain complexity is recognized as a type of risk in the risk 
management literature. Blackhurst, Dunn and Craighead (2011), established that the 
number of nodes is a proxy of complexity and that complexity can reduce resiliency. 
Moreover, supply chain complexity has been found to increase supply chain 
disruptions (Bode and Wagner, 2015). Since it increases the probability of supply 
chain disruptions, we would expect that firms with thigh industry – organizational 
risks will also develop resilience measures expressed in having a BCP. Our general 
assumption is that firms can learn from both the external environment and the internal 
environment. A complex product to keep track of can represent an opportunity to 
develop a supply chain resilience organizational culture. We posit that operating a 
complex supply chain network will encourage firms to develop a resilience culture, in 
order to counteract the impact of complexity on supply chain risks: 
H2: The more a firm is exposed to industry and organizational risks the more 
likely it will be to have a business continuity plan development process. 
 I this study we seek to understand the impact of disruptive events on 
developing a culture of supply chain resilience. It is important to make a distinction 
between disruptions and disruptive events. A disruption is an event that temporally 
interrupts the normal flow of goods at one or more stages of the supply chain. 
Hendricks and Singhal (2003) use actual public announcements of business 




delays. Disruptive events are events that a firm faces but that, due to the firm’s 
capability to deal with these events, may not interrupt the normal flow of goods of the 
supply chain. A resilient firm will successfully use its risk management program to 
put in place effective strategies to prevent disruptive events from becoming actual 
disruptions.  
 A firm that operates in an environment with high propensity for disruptive 
events will learn how to deal with those events, eventually avoiding actual 
disruptions. A firm that operates in Puerto Rico, for example, would know that from 
August through November is hurricane season. The firm should have a BCP in place 
in case of a hurricane, regardless of how many hurricanes actually occur in a given 
year. Precisely because the threat is present given the environment in which it 
operates, the firm cannot avoid the risk. According to the National Hurricane Center, 
from 1981 to 2012 there were 15 tropical storms, 8 hurricanes and 4 major hurricanes 
per year in the Atlantic zone. Not all of these become a major disruption like 
hurricane Maria in September 2017. Every time there is a hurricane alert, there are 
minor disruptions in order to allow the people in Puerto Rico to prepare for the storm. 
A minor disruption could be just having to close production for one or two days to 
ensure the safety of the employees and their families during the storm. A firm that 
operates in Puerto Rico would foresee a certain amount of these events during the 
hurricane season and would keep a higher level of inventory to ensure business 
continuity during those days, for example. A firm that operates in Puerto Rico and 




disruptions because it runs the risk of allowing these minor interruptions to become 
major disruptions. Therefore we pose that: 
H3: The more environmental disruptive events a firm has to face the more 
likely it is to have a business continuity plan development process. 
 Industry-organizational disruptions can be derived from many sources: 
machine failures, labor force strikes, liability, credit, and quality changes in input, 
among others (Rao and Goldsby, 2009). In our study we examine one particular 
industry-organizational disruptive event, product recalls. Product recalls fall under the 
liability category, “liability is associated with unanticipated harmful effects due to the 
production or consumption of a firm’s product” (Rao and Glodsby, 2009). Product 
recalls have also been included in the supply chain disruptions literature. For 
example, Hendricks and Singhal (2003) included recalls in the disruption dataset they 
used in their study.  
The Hendricks and Singhal (2003) study focused in the impact of disruptions 
on firm performance, but did not separately examine the impact of recalls. Wowak 
and Boone (2015) have an infrastructure category for disruptions, but this category 
includes various reasons for disruptions, aside from recalls.  More recently, Zsidisin 
et al (2016) conducted a study following the methodology of Hendricks and Singal, 
(2003). They include a moderating variable in their model describing the reason for 
the supply chain disruption. They categorize disruptions into four categories: 
catastrophic, infrastructure, regulatory and supply-side. Recalls are included in their 
dataset but are not separated as an independent variable. The authors find that each 




We single out product recalls as our variable for internal disruptive events 
because recalls can reflect overall firm quality and may be a key disruptor of supply 
chain performance. Wowak and Boone (2015) conducted an extensive literature 
review of the product recalls literature. They pointed out that although recalls may 
cause a supply chain disruption, they are different from other disruptions, since 
recalls are internal to the firm and therefore somewhat controllable.  
 Product recalls have been found to be detrimental to firm performance (Zhao 
et al, 2013). Recalls may reveal more about a firm than other kinds of disruption 
because they are related to the product of the firm. Safety issues with the product 
could be provoked by the culture of the firm, while environmental risks (e.g., 
hurricanes) cannot. Therefore, researchers have taken an effort to understand the 
drivers of recalls (Bromiley & Marcus, 1989;Wowak et al., 2015), the recall process 
(Hora et al., 2011) and how the “gravity” of the recall affects firm performance 
(Haunschild and Rhee, 2004)  
Moreover, the literature notes that a firm may learn from its recall experience.  
Kalaignanam et al. (2013) found that after a firm experiences a large recall, it tends to 
realize fewer and less severe recalls in the future. Thirumalai & Sinha (2011) found 
that in the medical devices industry, future recalls tend to be fewer and less severe 
after having to recall a medical device. Recalls are also disruptive events that may or 
may not become major disruptions. The action to be taken from the firm depends on 
the severity of the fault and so does the magnitude of the disruption. We argue that it 
is possible for a firm to learn from internal disruptive events like it is possible to learn 




culture. Firms that have experienced internal disruptions can learn from that 
experience and invest in developing a resilient culture. This culture can prevent future 
incidents and also deal with the incident more efficiently in case it happens again: 
H4: The more internal disruptive events a firm has faced in the past, the more 
likely it is to have developed a business continuity plan process. 
Re-engineering is one of the four pillars of resilience defined by Christopher 
and Peck (2004). The supply chain resilience literature has identified re-engineering 
most often with flexibility and redundancy (Kamalahdi and Parast, 2016). Juttner and 
Maklan (2011) found that flexibility and redundancy decrease supply chain 
vulnerability in a disruptive event. Carvalho et al. (2012) conducted a case study and 
simulation investigation to look at the redesign of the supply chain for resilience. 
They used two resilience strategies, redundancy in inventory (safety stock) and 
flexibility in transportation. They find that both strategies are able to reduce the 
impact of disturbances to the supply chain. Out of the two, our study focuses on 
redundancy. We will look at redundancy in inventory to determine a firm’s capacity 
to redistribute resources in case of a disruption.  
Blackhurst, Dunn and Craighead (2011) studied the impact of different factors 
on resilience. They find that safety stock is a supply chain resilience enhancer. 
Mandal (2012) uses a survey method to identify the antecedents of resilience. Under 
his re-engineering construct, keeping the “optimum” level of inventory is one factor 
identified. Inventory redundancy strategies can achieve a re-engineering effect by 




event is identified and is being counteracted. Resources can be reassigned internally, 
as needed, while the service continues.  
A safety stock inventory strategy that is well designed will cover all the 
phases of resilience. The strategy can be formulated in anticipation of a disruption. If 
a disruptive event happens, having safety stock on hand will allow the company to 
continue delivering orders, providing the firm with resistance to the disruption, which 
is the second phase of resilience per Kalahmadi and Parast (2016).  
Finally, the buffer inventory will help the firm reduce the longevity of the 
impact of the disruption on performance, making the recovery phase, the third phase 
of resilience, shorter in duration. A well-designed inventory strategy, combined with 
a culture of reacting immediately and resolving the disruption, will allow a firm to 
prevent small and medium-sized disruptive events from becoming larger business 
disruptions. For this reason, we will look at inventory levels as a re-engineering 
strategy for this study. 
 The supply chain risk management and resilience literature suggests that 
inventory levels should be kept at some level above the lowest necessary level in 
order to reduce the potential impact of unforeseen events. Empirical findings show 
that inventory can effectively mitigate the impact of a disruption on performance. 
Hendricks et al. (2009) found that inventory slack mitigates the negative effect of a 
disruption on stock value, using actual disruptions announcements and publicly 
available data. Schmitt and Singh (2012) found through a simulation study involving 
a multi-echelon supply chain that inventory placement can have unforeseen benefits 




allows a firm to stockpile inventory to increase resilience. The model operates at a 
network level by targeting a virtual transshipment effect that proves to be more cost 
efficient than simply keeping safety stock at a node level.  
 Since inventory redundancy impacts all the phases of supply chain resilience, 
we embedded the hypotheses regarding inventory into the two main resilience 
strategies we are examining. Moreover, we believe that the inventory strategy is a key 
component of a business continuity plan. Since inventory is also a resilience strategy 
we expect that firms that keep higher inventory levels will be more likely to have a 
BCP because we expect them to have a culture of resilience: 
H5: Firms with higher inventory will more likely have a business continuity 
plan. 
ii. Agility: Recovery Time 
In the supply chain literature, agility has been defined as “the ability of a 
supply chain to rapidly respond to change by adapting its initial stable configuration” 
(Wieland and Wallenburg, 2013). It has been identified in the supply chain resilience 
literature as an antecedent, driver or enhancer of resilience (Christopher and Peck, 
2004; Blackhurst et al, 2011; Soni et al, 2014; Kamalahmadi and Parast, 2016). 
Findings from the literature review by Kamalahmadi and Parast (2016), reveal two 
components of agility in the context of supply chain resilience: visibility and velocity. 
In this study we focus on the latter. In a risk context, velocity has been defined as the 
loss that happens per unit of time (Juttner and Maklan, 2011). The lesser the time of 




as projected recovery time. This is the time a location calculates it will take to recover 
from a worst-case scenario disruption. (The loss attached to this time, the revenue at 
risk, was not provided in the data sample due to confidentiality client privileges.) We 
use the time component of velocity as a proxy for velocity. Our study is in line with 
Brandon-Jones et al. (2014) that operationalizes supply chain resilience as speed in 
returning to the “normal state” after a disruptive event.   
The recovery time that we examine may be a function of proactive planning. It 
is calculated based on an estimation of a risk assessment analysis, not from the actual 
recovery time resulting from an actual disruption. Given that recovery time is a 
component of a BCP, for our study we focus on the subset of firms in our sample that 
have conducted a BCP. To have a BCP requires firms to have provided a definition of 
the processes and actions to be put in place in case of a disruption. Therefore, these 
are not a “random” set of firms, but the firms that have already given some thoughts 
to how to recover from a potential disaster. The BCP facilitates the decision-making 
process during the period after the disruption. Given this subset of firms, we examine 
recovery time to understand which factors make this time longer or shorter.  
Firms that operate in an environment prone to disruptions may be better able 
to cope with disasters, given their prior experience and also the depth of the planning 
that likely entered into the BCP. These firms have developed a culture of resilience, 
where practices such as business continuity plan are implemented. We expect that 
firms that operate under higher environmental risks and have a business continuity 




in the most agile way possible. We expect the risky environment to make these firms 
more agile because of the intangible learning experience that the environment elicits.  
H6: The higher the external environmental risk the better performing the 
recovery time will be. 
Internal risks may be detrimental to agility. Having more nodes in the supply 
chain network and more critical parts increases the number of transactions and 
relationships a firm has to maintain to guard against and recover from a disruption. 
Complexity increases the number of components, products and locations to be 
tracked. Moreover, complexity increases the need for communications between 
supply chain nodes, increases the number of decision making points, and enhances 
the probability for delays in the delivery of raw materials. Although we stated in H2 
that complexity will increase the probability of a firm developing a resilience culture, 
we posit that complexity will be detrimental to recovery time for those firms that have 
a BCP. In other words, it would be harder to reduce recovery time for a firm with a 
big and complex supply chain network.  
H7: The higher the internal risk a firm faces, the worse performing recovery 
time will be. 
 Following the same rationale as H6, we expect disruptive events to increase 
the agility of the firm. Disruptive events would provide “practice” to a firm and it 
would have a more precise estimate of how much time it takes to recover from 
different interruptions and it would be more aware of actions that can be taken to 




H8: The more environmental disruptive events a firm faces, the better 
performing its recovery time will be. 
 In the case of internal disruptive events, since these are provoked by industry-
organizational factors, we expect the experience of these disruptions will cause a 
desire for change. Since change takes time, we lagged these events and propose that 
experience from such disruptions in the past will have a positive impact on the 
recovery time. 
H9: Firms that have previously experienced internal disruptive events will 
have a better performing recovery time. 
 Finally, our last hypothesis regards inventory. Inventory redundancy will help 
a firm reduce the time of the disruption and may even help prevent the disruptive 
event from becoming an actual disruption. Since, for this set of hypotheses we are 
examining firms that already have taken steps towards resilience planning by 
developing BCPs, we would expect higher levels of inventory to reflect inventory 
slack strategies. For this reason we expect that more inventory should be associated 
with faster recovery: 
H10: The higher the inventory, the faster the recovery time will be. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the hypotheses with the operationalized variables and 







In this study we combine data from 3 data sources.  
i. Resilinc Data 
Our first data source is from the firm, Resilinc. Resilinc provides supply chain 
risk management services to its clients. The Resilinc software tool allows firms to 
track their supply chains, as well as their supplier’s supply chains, identify 
vulnerabilities in the supply chains, design resilient strategies, take mitigating actions 
to reduce vulnerabilities, and receive notification of disruptions using social 
networks, among other services. A Resilinc customer can use the software to map its 




component suppliers and the manufacturing locations where these components are 
processed.  
Resilinc keeps track of news through social media notification, and provides 
announcements of potential disruptive events affecting a geographical area. Since the 
locations of a firm are mapped using the Resilinc software tool, the program forwards 
notifications with impact estimations to firm executives according to a notification 
hierarchy that is also part of the tool. A customer is able to identify vulnerabilities 
across supply chain tiers, and identify if the firm will be impacted by a disruptive 
event and the potential extent of the impact. The customer can also assess the 
potential risk of its suppliers, its products or the geographical regions in which it 
holds operations.  
Resilinc provided us the population of disruption alerts that were sent during 
the year, 2014. These events are categorized into 4 types: 1) hurricanes, 2) fires, 3) 
earthquakes and 4) other. When a potential disruption is identified, Resilinc sends a 
notification customized for each firm with relevant details such as, the number of 
sites impacted and the potential revenue impact. The customer has the advantage of 
immediate notification, and managers can begin to make plans and decisions 
providing the firm visibility into the disruption and the opportunity to recover from 
the disruption. 
For the purposes of identification, the Resilinc customers are referred to as the 
“focal firms”. These are the firms that are making investments in developing 
resilience for their supply chains. There is no information about the focal firm in our 




year, 2014.  Our dataset, therefore, is a cross section for the year, 2014 consisting of 
data related to the supply chains of Reslinc customers. The database contains 
information on both tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers to the focal firms, but the list of firms 
in our data is not linked in any way to the focal firms. There is no information about 
which focal firms a supplier firm in our data is serving. This makes our sample a 
random sample of individual firms that may or may not be involved in developing 
resilience.  
The Reslinc service includes identifying “critical” production sites for the 
focal firms. This criticality is most often given by the fact that in those sites critical 
activities that affect high revenue products are performed. Therefore, an interruption 
to these sites could have high revenue impact. For example, these sites are often 
places were single-source activities are taking place. Since these places are linked to 
high revenue impacts, the risk assessment exercise includes business continuity plan 
and recovery time calculations.  
The dataset often contains information on multiple manufacturing locations 
per firm. This information includes: 1) site geographical location (country and 
coordinates), 2) site risk scores (based on country risk scores provided by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit), 3) recovery time (self-reported analysis of disaster 
recovery given in weeks), 4) critical parts that are handled at that location and 5) 
actual potential disruptive events in the year 2014 that affected the geographical area 
where the facility is located.  
We gathered a sample of firms from the Resilinc database that contains all the 




to firms in the Compustat database in order to get financial information on the firms. 
A total of 313 firms matched with Compustat. These are linked to 3,262 
manufacturing locations, 75 countries, and 40 industries following a three-digit 
NAICS code.  
Even though the risk scores for each manufacturing location were provided by 
Resilinc, it is important to note that the geopolitical risk scores originated at the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EUI). The EUI provides many services of risk 
assessment using scores from 1 (lowest risk) to 10 (highest risk). In our study, we use 
three of these scores to assess the geographical risk associated with a location: 
Geopolitical Risk, Natural Disaster Risk and Macroeconomic Risk. These are revised 
and updated every three to five years by the EUI, depending on the score and the 
country assessed.  
ii. Compustat 
There are a number of variables that we drew from the Compustat database in 
that they were not available internally through Resilinc. Inventory data and 
performance (profitability) data were not available for the sites or the firms in the 
Resilinc database. Therefore, we captured these data from Compustat. In addition, we 
use the Compustate database for cost of goods sold, total revenue, number of 
employees and research and development investment to calculate control variables. 
We used the year 2014 to calculate the gross margin, days of inventory and other 
relevant variables to our study.  
In addition, we used data for the past 10 years from the industries involved in 




control for industry effects). We calculated 3, 5 and 10-year 3-digit NAICS code 
Compustat industry aggregated data variables for these purposes.  
Since only publicly-traded firms present data on Compustat, we excluded 
observations where these data were not available. We then matched firms from 
Resilinc to Compustat. The result of this first match consists of 313 firms.   
iii. Recalls Data 
We also gathered information on product recalls. For this data we selected 
only three 3-digit NAICS industries. We chose these three industries because they the 
industries in our sample with the highest frequencies that were manufacturing 
industries not service industries. Table 2 shows the industries with a description and 
frequency. We collected recalls data for each firm in these three industries for the past 
ten years. The recalls data come from two US government sources (depending on the 
product) that provide public information on recalls: 1) Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, 2) Food and Drug Administration. The Consumer Product Safety 
Commission deals with recalls related to regular consumer products, such as toys, 
electrical equipment, clothes, home artifacts, computers, etc. The Food and Drug 
Administration contains recalls related to food, medicines, medical devices and 
cosmetics. Automotive vehicles related recalls are contained in a separate database, 
we do not have any such recalls in our dataset. These agencies only contain 
information about recalls in the US. We recognize that other countries might have 
different expectations and regulations about products and that recalls might be 
different. We recognize this can represent a limitation when studying global supply 




where they are sold, we believe that although it might be limited, using the US 
product recalls databases provides sufficient information about the firm and the 
product for the purpose of our study. A product that was recalled in the US was not 
manufactured exclusively in the US. Adding the recalls data reduced the number of 
firms to 173 in the data base. 
iv. Final Database 
We started with over 1,000 firms and 25,000 manufacturing locations 
provided by Resilinc. 325 of the firms were publicly traded with financial information 
reported in Compustat. 12 firms were eliminated, 4 were duplicates and 8 were name 
mismatches that turned out not to be the same firm from Resilinc and Compustat. 
Choosing only three industries for the recalls data reduced the number of firms to 
173. Fourteen observations were deleted due to missing data from Compustat. The 
2014 cross-sectional sample contains 159 firm-level observations. These 159 firms 
are linked to 2,036 manufacturing locations that are present in 75 countries. 1,993 
recalls over the course of ten years were reported involving these 159 firms. Table 2 
shows the three industries included in our data sample with the number of firms in 





Table 2: Industry Descriptions and Frequency
NAICS Industry Description Obs
325 Chemical Manufacturing 41
333 Machinery Manufacturing 22




The data that were originally provided at the manufacturing location level 
were aggregated to create firm level variables. Geopolitical risk, natural disaster risk, 
minimum wage and recovery time are aggregated to the firm level by calculating the 
average among the firm’s locations. The number of countries in which these sites are 
located is used as a count variable at the firm level to illustrate breadth of operations. 
The amount of critical parts that are managed at a location and the events that 
impacted each site are also aggregated as a count variable to the firm level. Days of 
inventory and gross margin are calculated at the firm level using Compustat data. The 
recalls data are aggregated into several variables with different time frames at the 
firm level. Long term variables for days of inventory and gross margin are also 
calculated at the firm level.  
The 2014 cross sectional database has 159 firm level observations that 
include: 1) average geopolitical risk score, 2) average natural disaster risk score, 3) 
average recovery time, 4) number of countries, 5) number of sites, 6) number of parts, 
7) number of potentially disruptive events, 8) days of inventory, 9) number of recalls, 
and other calculations involving these variables.  More details on these variables are 
provided in the next section. 
Variables: 
Environmental Risk: Manufacturing Location Risk 
Three risk measures were provided for each manufacturing location. The 
Geopolitical risk score is assigned a value from 1 to 10, depending on the country 
where the manufacturing site is located; 10 being the highest risk and 1 being the 




considers the probability of the country being invaded by another country, having a 
coup, entering into a war with another country, having a big change in government 
(example, going from democracy to dictatorship) and other political risks.  
The Macroeconomic risk score is also originated at the EIU. This measure 
considers the probability of a country’s economy collapsing, like it happened recently 
to Venezuela or less recently to Greece. This score also ranges from 1 to 10, from 
lowest risk to highest risk. 
Natural Disaster risk score considers the probability for the country to have a 
natural disaster. Hurricanes, earth quakes, typhoons, tsunamis, tornadoes, are all 
considered in this score depending on the geographical region of the country. These 
scores are reevaluated every 3 to 5 years. 
For the purpose of our investigation, we calculate a location risk score (LocRisk) 
using these 3 scores. The three risk scores are added for each location. To aggregate 
to the firm level, a weighted average is calculated so that if a firm has multiple 
locations in the same country, this weight is reflected in the location risk score. The 
location risk score ranges from 1 to 10, an average score that combines all three types 
of risk. We chose this measure instead of evaluating each risk independently after 
speaking with practitioners and the Resilinc research team. They informed us that 
when performing risk assessments, practitioners combined the three scores because 
they are interested in knowing the overall risk of the location in order to take 
resilience strategy decisions. Location risk, therefore, provides an overall risk 
measure for operations for a firm. We use this variable to operationalize 




Internal Risk: Supply Chain Complexity (Critical Parts and Sites) 
The second risk measurement we use combines industry risk and organizational 
risk, according to the definitions of Rao and Goldsby, (2009). For each manufacturing 
location that has a contingency plan, there is information on how many critical 
components are processed in that location. These are components of high revenue 
products, but due to client privileges we do not have bills of materials to link the 
components to products. More than 90% of these components are single sourced at 
that given location. We count how many critical components are processed at each 
single location. Then we aggregate this count through a sum at the firm level.  It is 
possible that this count variable counts a single component more than once, if this 
part is processed for different manufacturing purposes at more than one facility. 
However, we believe this count variable is a good proxy for internal complexity. As it 
provides information about the number of times that components need to be tracked, 
analyzed, processed, etc. The more critical parts that have to be processed at different 
locations, the more complex the internal supply chain network is.  
The more complex the product, the more parts it will have and the more critical 
parts it will have. It is impossible for us to separate product complexity, which is 
highly dependent from the industry from supply chain internal network complexity, 
which depends on the decisions of the firm. We are using the total critical parts 
variable to operationalize internal risks. The information was provided at the location 
level. The variable is aggregated by adding all the critical parts from all locations of 
the firm. We call this variable (Total Parts). To control for the industry effect, all 




for the firms that performed a business continuity plan, it is not available to test our 
first set of hypotheses. 
When total critical parts is not available, we use the number of manufacturing 
sites (Sites) as a variable to operationalize internal risk. The number of sites provides 
information about how big the supply chain network is by approximating the number 
of nodes it has. Per Blackhurst, Dunn and Craighead, (2011), the number of nodes is a 
proxy of complexity that has a negative impact in resilience. Like total critical parts, 
the number of sites can be an industry condition. We control for this effect by 
controlling for industry in our model. 
Environmental Disruptive Events: Events 
The Resilinc database includes over 90 disruptive event alerts that Resilinc 
tracked during the year of 2014. These were provided with the geographical 
coordinates of an estimated region that they impacted. The geographical coordinates 
were matched to the coordinates provided for each manufacturing location in order to 
identify the sites that were impacted by each disruptive event. The number of events 
that impacted a site were gathered as a count variable. These were added at the firm 
level in order to obtain an aggregated variable. This variable is not a count of actual 
disruptions, such as the variable used by Hendricks and Singhal, (2003). Our variable 
measures how many potential disruptions or disruptive events the firm faced that year 
due to disruptions at their manufacturing locations.  
Kim et al, (2015) established that not all node level disruptions necessarily lead to 
network-level disruptions. Our (events) variable provides a good opportunity to look 




can reveal a firm’s capacity to endure a disruption and prevent it from becoming a 
network-level disruption 
Another variable is also used in some of the models that was calculated 
combining the number of sites and the number of events that a firm had in the year 
2014. Events per site (Eventsite) was calculated dividing the total number of events 
for a firm by the number of sites the firm has in the database.  
Internal Disruptive Events: Recalls 
In our study, we distinguish between environmental disruptive events and internal 
disruptive events. We operationalize the internal disruptions through product recalls. 
In the United States, recalls have to be publicly notified through government agencies 
that keep record of all recalls. We collected the number of recall announcements for 
each year for each firm in our database. Depending on the product, data were reported 
to the Consumer Product Safety Commission or the Food and Drug Administration. 
Public records of both agencies were checked for announcements.  
The recalls data goes from 2004 to 2014. Even though our data set for other 
variables consists of a cross section from 2014, we collected recalls up to 10 years 
before because we test if the experience of having recalls in the past impacts the 
resilience strategies of the firm. Since culture takes a long time to change, we 
collected information for 10 years. The data are collected by year and aggregated into 
four variables, all of them count variables: Previous Recalls includes the recalls 
reported for the past ten years, from 2004 to 2013. Five years recalls (5yrRecalls) 
includes recalls for the past 5 years, from 2009 to 2013. Last year recalls 




(CurrentRecalls) includes the recalls from 2014, the same year as the cross-sectional 
dataset. The models are run using the different recalls variable to see if our results are 
robust across different definitions of internal risks (recalls).  
Supply Chain Resilience Strategies 
i. Inventory: Days of Inventory (DOI) 
Since our dataset is a cross sectional dataset, we chose days of inventory 
(DOI) as our inventory measure.  There are different ways in the literature to 
calculate this variable. We followed Chen et al, (2005) that defined DOI as follows: 
DOI = (Total Inventory/Costs of goods sold) * 365 
This measurements were calculated using end of year data. 
ii. Risk Management Culture: Business Continuity Planning 
Christopher and Peck, (2004) define risk management culture by three main 
traits: 1) Presence of a supply chain representative in the leadership team, 2) Formal 
risk assessment processes for decision making, 3) Presence of metrics and routine 
reviews of risks. Often the presence of a risk management culture has been 
operationalized in survey studies by capturing the presence of a risk assessment 
process (Juttner and Maklan, 2011; Mandal, 2012; Soni, et al, 2014; Ambulkar et al, 
2015). The firms in the Resilinc dataset that have a business continuity plan, have 
conducted a risk assessment exercise at the site level, identifying the most probable 




estimate how long it would take to recover activity in that site in case this event 
occurs.  
Having a business continuity plan in our sample constitutes a thorough risk 
assessment process for decision making. This variable is the dependent variable used 
to test the first group of hypotheses. The variable is assigned a value of 0 if the site 
does not have the plan and a value of 1 if the plan exists. 97 of the 159 firms in our 
sample have business continuity plan, 62 firms do not have it. These 97 firms have 2, 
698 sites, while the 62 firms that do not have business continuity plan represent 368 
sites. 
iii. Agility: Recovery Time 
As part of the development of a business continuity plan, each site calculates 
how long it would take to recover activity to the location in case of a disruption. This 
measure is then used by the focal firm to assess the risk that the supplier poses to the 
focal firm. Per Christopher and Peck, (2004) this would also contribute to the culture 
of risk management. The recovery time was provided in weeks at the site-level. It was 
aggregated to the firm level through calculating an average among all the sites that 
belong to the firm. This variable is only available for the firms that have a BCP.  
Control Variables 
Our study is conducted at the firm level. There are many firm characteristics that 
can influence our dependent variables and need to be controlled in our models. To 
control for firm profitability, we include gross margin (gmargin) in our models. Gross 




for size of the companies there are various options. We use research and development 
investment (RD). We use research and development because the supply chain 
resilience literature links resilience with innovation (Kamalahdi and Parast, 2016). By 
choosing RD we also control for innovation. We control for industry effects by 
running our models with robust clusters for industries.  Table 3 shows a summary of 









To test the first group of hypotheses (H1-H5) we used a logistic regression 
model. Since we are trying to understand if the factors we have proposed will actually 
influence a firm into developing a risk management culture through the presence or 
absence of a business continuity plan, we find the logit model to be the most 
appropriate one.  
Models for BPC: Testing for Supply Chain Risk Management Culture Presence 
Model 1 
 Our first model uses the number of manufacturing locations to test for internal 
risks and the number of events per site to test for environmental disruptive events. 
The model is as follows: 
BCP =  α0 + α1(LocRisk) + α2(Sites) + α3(Eventsites) + α4(PreviousRecalls) 
+ α5(DOI) + α6(gmargin) + α7(RD)…………………………………..(Equation 1) 
Model 2 
The second model uses the number of environmental disruptive events to test 
for hypothesis 3 and leaves out the number of manufacturing locations. The number 
of manufacturing locations is highly correlated to the number of disruptive events. 
We decided to run two models alternating the use of these variables to understand the 
effects better. These two first models seek to understand with a certain robustness the 




BCP  =  α0 + α1(LocRisk) +  α2(events) + α3(PreviousRecalls) + α4(DOI) + 
α5(gmargin) + α6(RD)………………………………………………(Equation 2) 
Models 3 to 5 
 Models 3 to 5 use different versions of the variable for product recalls. These 
models differ in the time frame in which the product recalls are being counted. This is 
done to verify if the time frame that is being considered changes in any way the 
statistical results. All three models follow the equation below: 
BCP =  α0 + α1(LocRisk) + α2(Sites) + α3(Eventsites) + α4(Recalls) + 
α5(DOI) + α6(gmargin) + α7(RD……………………………(Equation 3) 
 We run these models using Stata standard package using a robust logistic 
regression model that is clustered by industry. The robust clustered model adjusts the 
standard errors of the coefficients according the clusters. In this way, we control for 
industry effects.  
Models 6, 7 and 8 
 The second part of our investigation concerns the agility with which firms 
consider they can recover from a disruption. The dependent variable for these models 
is recovery time (Recovery). Since the dependent variable in this case is a continuous 
variable, we use a regular linear regression model for this part of our investigation. 
We use the number of critical parts (TotalParts) to test the impact of internal risks in 





Recovery = =  α0 + α1(LocRisk) + α2(CritParts) + α3(Eventsites) + 
α4(CurrentRecalls) + α5(DOI) + α6(gmargin) + α7(RD)…….(Equation 4) 
Following the same structure but changing current recalls for previous recalls, Model 
7 is as follows: 
Recovery =  α0 + α1(LocRisk) + α2(Sites) + α3(Eventsites) + 
α4(PreviousRecalls) + α5(DOI) + α6(gmargin) + α7(RD)…………(Equation 5) 
Model 8 uses the amount of recalls in the past 5 years: 
Recovery =  α0 + α1(LocRisk) + α2(Sites) + α3(Eventsites) + α4(5yrRecalls) + 
α5(DOI) + α6(gmargin) + α7(RD)………………………………….(Equation 6) 
Models 6, 7 and 8 are also ran using the Stata standard package. The robust 











Table 4 shows descriptive statistics and the correlation table for our sample. 
As can be seen, none of the independent variables has a very high correlation with 
BCP. Sites and events are highly correlated at 0.85; for this reason we do not run 
these two variables together. We created a variable that combines them, Eventsites, in 
order to resolve the high correlation issue. Sites is also highly correlated with 
Recovery. Models 6 and 7 where Recovery is the dependent variable do not have 
Sites as an independent variable for this reason. Events is also highly correlated with 
Recovery. We use Eventsites for all the Recovery models. 
 
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for the two subgroups in our sample. The 
group that has a business continuity plan and the group that does not. The group with 
business continuity planning is our sample for the second set of models that is testing 
agility through recovery time. The total number of observations for this subgroup is 
97.  
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Table
Mean STD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 LocRisk 3.92 1.01 1.67 6 1
2 TotalParts 359 1,481 1 14,153 0.219 1
3 Sites 21 29 1 130 0.296 0.493 1
4 events 14 21 0 109 0.315 0.248 0.849 1
5 Eventsites 0.84 0.77 0 4 0.219 -0.119 -0.136 0.092 1
6 PreviousRecalls 12 57 0 444 -0.054 -0.049 -0.130 -0.113 0.200 1
7 5yrRecalls 7 32 0 211 -0.107 -0.051 -0.134 -0.117 0.172 0.928 1
8 2013Recalls 1 5 0 36 -0.134 -0.050 -0.132 -0.121 0.083 0.904 0.949 1
9 CurrentRecalls 2 12 0 125 -0.123 -0.039 -0.104 -0.092 0.131 0.651 0.754 0.693 1
10 DOI 99.84 46.89 21.57 264 0.0128 0.0958 -0.0441 0.0041 0.1032 0.2699 0.2407 0.2791 0.2145 1
11 BCP 0.65 0.48 0 1 0.544 0.180 0.374 0.340 -0.045 -0.194 -0.228 -0.218 -0.155 -0.019 1
12 Recovery 14.83 25.10 0 122 0.418 0.508 0.842 0.716 -0.108 -0.113 -0.118 -0.114 -0.088 0.044 0.439 1
13 gmargin 0.44 0.17 0.07 0.82 0.056 -0.151 -0.134 0.014 0.141 0.171 0.148 0.149 0.165 0.439 0.067 0.010 1





BCP Models Results 
 Table 6 shows the results for models 1-5. Model 1 shows location risk is 
statistically significant and with a positive sign as was expected. Significance and 
sign stay stable throughout all five models. We find strong support for H1. As 
expected, the higher the environmental risk a firm faces, the more likely it will be to 
have a risk management culture to deal with that risk. Sites is also strongly significant 
and positive. Providing support for H2, that internal risks will also make a firm 
develop risk management culture. Events per site (Eventsites) comes out with a 
negative sign and not significant. This result is contrary to what was expected. The 
negative sign remains stable throughout the models and it is not significant in any of 
them. However the variable (events) that is used in Model 2 is strongly significant 
with a positive sign as was expected from H3. The number of manufacturing 
locations (Sites) provides information about the size of the network of a firm. This 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for the two subgroups with and without BCP
BCP = Yes BCP = No BCP = Yes BCP = No BCP = Yes BCP = No BCP = Yes BCP = No
LocRisk 4.31 3.24 0.81 0.95 2.67 1.67 5.95 6
TotalParts 538 - 1,780 0 0 0 14,153 0
Sites 28 6 32 9 1 1 130 42
events 19 5 23 7 0 0 109 42
Eventsites 0.81 0.88 0.63 0.94 0 0 3 4
PreviousRecalls 4 22 28 79 0 0 276 444
5yrRecalls 1 14 10 47 0 0 97 211
2013Recalls 0 2 2 7 0 0 17 36
CurrentRecalls 1 4 5 17 0 0 46 125
DOI 100 101 52 47 22 15 284 208
BCP 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Recovery 22.37 - 27.76 0.00 1 0 122 0
gmargin 0.44 0.41 0.18 0.17 0.07 0.09 0.82 0.90
RD 732.15 576.10 1,824.74 1,371.20 0 0.072 11,537 9,086




gives an idea of internal complexity. On the other hand, the number of disruptive 
events a firm faces in a year gives information about the environment and how 
complex it can become to manage the supply chain. Combining the two things and 
calculating the number of events per site, should provide information about the 
potential disruptions with respect to the size. However, these events are linked to 
geographical locations. It can be that a firm protects itself by also having operations 
in less threatened places. It could be that this variable is picking up a risk leveraging 
effect and that might be why it is not significant, even though the two variables tested 
separately are strongly significant. Therefore, we find statistical evidence to support 
both H2 and H3. It would be necessary to do further research to understand how they 
interact.  
 The most interesting result is the result of H4. The recalls variables come out 
significant but with the opposite sign as expected. Four versions of the variable were 
tested. Recalls from the previous 10 years, recalls for the previous 5 years, recalls for 
the year before and current recalls. The only one not significant is current recalls, 
which is reasonable because we are looking at the impact on something that is 
strongly cultural. Effects take time. Models 3-5 provide strong evidence that previous 
recalls do not lead to a resilience planning strategy. The results for disruptions 
suggest that a firm is motivated to develop resilience strategies when prompted by 
environmental conditions but not when having faced organizational failures as recalls 




 The results for inventory, DOI, were not significant. There is no statistical 
evidence for H5. It is important to note that even though there is no significance, the 
sign is consistently negative, that is the opposite of what was expected.  
 The control variables, gross margin and R&D intensity, are not significant in 
any of the 5 models, but do have the expected positive sign. Our variables explain 
from 34 to 40% of the variance in the sample as it is shown by the pseudo R2 values. 
 
Table 7 shows the results for models 6, 7 and 8. As can be seen in Table 7, 
location risk comes out statistically significant for models 6, 7 and 8 at the 5% level. 
The sign is opposite from what was hypothesized. The sign is positive, indicating that 
firms that operate in a higher risk environment have a longer recovery time. H6 is not 
supported. H7 is strongly supported, TotalParts is significant at the 1% level in all 
models with a positive sign as expected. We find evidence that internal risk measured 
Table 6: Results for Logit Model (Business Continuity Plan)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
LocRisk 1.533 ** 1.371 *** 1.518 ** 1.511 ** 1.524 **
Sites 0.053 *** 0.053 *** 0.053 *** 0.054 ***
events 0.060 ***
Eventsites -0.514 -0.497 -0.531 -0.600




DOI -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
gmargin 2.311 1.873 2.340 2.303 2.184
RD 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
cons -6.248 *** -5.661 *** -6.200 *** -6.178 *** -6.142 ***
Pseudo R2 0.393 0.349 0.397 0.394 0.386
N 146 146 146 146 146




through complexity makes a longer time required to recover from disruptions. H8 is 
also supported with a negative sign and significance level at the 5% level. H10 for 
inventory is not supported, DOI is not significant for any of the models. 
The results for the internal disruptive events, recalls, is significant for both 
previous and current recalls with the expected negative sign at a 5% level for previous 
recalls and 10% level for current recalls. This is an interesting result because in the 
first models, recalls came out with a negative sign, suggesting that firms with recalls 
do not invest in developing a culture of resilience. However, in this second group of 
models the results indicate that firms that face disruptions like recalls are more agile 





Table 7: Results for Agility Models
Recovery Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
LocRisk 8.279 ** 8.249 ** 8.228 **
TotalParts 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.007 ***




DOI -0.001 0.001 0.001
gmargin 10.906 10.831 10.868
RD -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001
cons -16.492 -16.506 -16.507
R2 0.303 0.304 0.304
N 93 93 93














Environmental and Internal Risk Results Discussion 
 The results for location risk were as expected for the first part involving the 
presence or absence of a resilience culture through having a business continuity plan, 
but were the opposite as expected for recovery time. There is clear evidence that a 
risky environment will increase the probability of taking measures to survive in that 
environment. The recovery time results need to be analyzed further. The sample for 
recovery time is a cross sectional sample that is already in a risk management culture 
(given that all firms had a BCP). Within this set of data, firms that operate in a riskier 
geographical environment would take longer to recover. This is an interesting and 
reasonable result, as we are looking at the average of recovery time across the firm. 








H1 LocRisk BCP + supported




BCP + partially supported
H4 Recalls BCP + significant, opposite sign
H5 DOI BCP + not supported
H6 LocRisk Recovery - significant, opposite sign
H7 TotalParts Recovery + supported
H8 Eventsites Recovery - supported
H9 Recalls Recovery - supported




Therefore the more disruptive events a firm has to take into consideration and plan 
for, the longer the recovery will likely take.  
Another possible reason for this result is that when firms make these plans, 
they consider worst-case scenarios. Firms that are more used to the risk of the 
environment will have a better sense of what it will take to go back to normal, making 
for longer recovery expectations.  
Another aspect to consider when looking at these results is that the business 
continuity plan is done often separately from other contingency plans, such as 
inventory. In fact, the days of inventory did not have a significant outcome in any of 
the models, suggesting that inventory levels do not affect the projected time to 
recovery. Inventory as a supply chain resilience strategy is most likely a separate 
strategy. Both these strategies would definitely come together when an actual 
disruption happens and they would both impact the recovery time, but from a 
planning point of view, decisions and plans about them are done separately.  
Recovery time is influence by other characteristics, such as lead time, the type 
of disruptions that the firm is considering it might have at each specific location, the 
understanding of options and time that it would take to understand those options, the 
nature of the products, and the industry. Unfortunately, we do not have data on these 
variables. Lead time is highly dependent on the industry and we controlled for 
industry effects in our models. Our variables explain 30% of the variance for the 





 The results for internal risks, both for network size and for the number of 
critical parts proxies, were as expected. Our results link network and product 
complexity, following the findings of Bode and Wagner, (2015). They found that 
supply chain complexity increases the frequency of supply chain disruptions. We are 
finding that complexity also increases the probability of developing a resilient culture 
and it slows down the capacity to recover from a disruption.  
Environmental and Internal Disruptive Events Results Discussion 
 In our study we separated internal disruptive events from external disruptive 
events. Following the findings of Zsidisin et al, (2016), we distinguished the type of 
disruptive event.  They found that the reason for the disruption moderates the impact 
of the disruption on performance. We proposed that the origin of the disruptive event, 
internal or external will make affect the impact on resilience. 
 The results for environmental disruptive events are partially supported 
through the events variable being significant for the business continuity plan in model 
2 (although the events per site variable was not found significant). The major results 
for this type of disruption, caused by external factors to the firm, demonstrate the 
expected results. They increase the probability to have resilience cultural traits in the 
firm and they contribute to a faster expected recovery time. This is an interesting 
finding because it suggests that a risky environment where small and medium 
disruptive events happen with a certain frequency, a firm could be motivated to 
develop an organizational culture that is proactive and that can react better to 




 The results for the impact of recalls on the existence of a recovery plan and on 
recovery time are very interesting. In the first set of models, we get a negative 
significant sign, indicating that firms that have experienced recalls do not take on 
resilience practices. This result is opposite to the findings of Thirumalai & Sinha, 
(2011). They found there could be a learning effect after experiencing a recall. They 
found that firms that recall a medical device tend to experience fewer recalls. Recalls 
in our study is an independent variable, while in their study it was the dependent 
variable. However, a logical expectation from their findings would be that firms that 
have experienced a recall would build resilience into their supply chain in order to 
avoid future recalls. Our findings did not follow this logic.  
In order to understand our results better, we did a difference of means test 
between the sample subgroup that does business continuity planning and the 
subgroup that does not. We tested all four recalls variables to understand if the means 
were different. The results of this test showed that all four versions of the recalls 
variable are significantly different for the two groups at a 5% significance level, with 
the most recent recalls 5yrRecalls and 2013Recalls being significant at 1% 
significance level. With this additional step, we can say that firms with resilience 
practices (BCPs) have experience fewer recalls than firms with less resilience 
practices. It seems that experiencing a recall is not strong enough motivation to 
develop business continuity plans. Not all is lost. When we look at the results for the 
recovery time, recalls comes out with a negative sign and is statistically significant 
suggesting that firms that experience recalls are expecting to recover faster. A 




develop ways to recover faster from disruptions and have fewer recalls. This 
explanation is an interesting finding to investigate in a future study. Our findings 
seem to suggest that the learning factor that Thirumalai & Sinha, (2011) found in 
their study is moderated by organizational culture, specifically resilience cultural 
traits. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
We recognize that there are some limitations to our research. Some of our variables 
had some limitations that did not impede our investigation but that it would have been 
more robust to have more detailed information. The Total Parts variable would have 
been more robust if instead of critical components we would have been able to link 
the manufacturing sites to finished products. This was not possible due to 
confidentiality issues. Disruptive events data was only provided for the year 2014, it 
would have been more accurate if it would have been possible to have data about 
events over years to match the recalls database. However we were able to set up the 
variables in a way that the information necessary to conduct our investigation was 
available for testing the hypotheses. 
 Our study has focused on the impact of internal and external factors in supply 
chain resilience strategies. The variable used for recovery time was an estimated 
variable. Future research could look at how many of the disruptive events actually 




frequency and how long it actually takes to recover once the event becomes a network 
disruption.  
CONCLUSIONS AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Our study contributes to the literature of supply chain resilience. It falls into a 
group of studies that look at resilience as a dependent variable. Our sample is unique 
because it contains actual resilience strategies data from a cross sectional sample 
combined with firm level public data from Compustat. This unique database allows 
us to study the effect of our independent variables at a firm level. We introduce the 
impact of geographical location risks using an objective third-party developed score, 
instead of perceptions from practitioners on the development of supply chain 
resilience.  
We add to the literature a set of variables, actual disruptive events that could 
impact firms, but that did not necessarily become an actual disruption for the firm. To 
this time, the disruption variables in the literature were constructed by actual public 
announcements of disruptions, such as in the studies performed by Hendricks and 
Singhal (2003), (2005) and (2009), disruptions developed through simulations 
(Carvalho and Machado, 2007; Carvalho et al, 2012) and case studies and surveys of 
employees perceptions on disruptions and disruption management (Mandal, 2012; 
Blackhurst et al, 2011; Brandon-Jones et al, 2014). Our variable adds to the literature 
by providing empirical information about events that firms have faced before these 




developing supply chain resilience. We also introduce recalls as an independent 
variable in the supply chain resilience research stream. Recalls have been included in 
supply chain disruptions studies, such as Hendricks and Singhal, (2003) and the more 
recent Zsidisin et al, (2016,) but have not been included as separate factor. This is 
important because our results show that recalls might have a different impact on 
resilience than other type of events, as was suggested by Wowak and Boone, (2016). 
 Our first conclusion is that operating in a risky geographical environment is a 
driver to developing a supply chain resilience culture. Previous literature identifies 
geographical risk as a negative sometimes hidden effect on performance (Hogwell et 
al., 2011;Wagner and Bode, 2008), but our findings show that it can be an 
opportunity for the leadership team to promote and develop an organizational culture 
of supply chain resilience. A resilience culture is a competitive asset in the current 
global environment (Sheffi, 2005). 
 Environmental external disruptive events that do not necessarily become a 
network disruption can have a positive impact on resilience. Firms that experience 
more disruptive events tend to be more willing to establish a culture of resilience. 
This culture could become the factor in the future that helps the firm prevent or 
survive a big disruption event as suggested by Sheffi (2005) and Sheffi (2015). 
Factors that trigger resilience are good for the firm. 
 Firms that have experienced internal disruptive events, such as recalls, tend to 
not undertake a more resilient culture. However, the firms that are involved in BCP 




for managers to understand because developing a resilience culture can help them 
recover from future recalls faster and even avoid having more recalls in the future.  
 Inventory seems to be an independent resilience strategy that would have to be 
studied further as the results of inventory from our study do not allow us to make any 
conclusions about their impact on recovery. This finding may be due to the fact that 
individual operating characteristics of firms may be greatest determinants of 
inventory levels. Therefore, there is no systematic relationship between inventory and 
resiliency.  
 It is relevant for managers to understand that operating in a risky environment 
and dealing with the complexity of a global supply chain can be used as an 
opportunity to develop a more resilient supply chain so that the firm is able to adapt 
to a volatile environment. Instead of focusing on avoiding supply chain risk, 
managers can focus on awareness and contingency planning providing the 
opportunity for firms to enjoy the potential rewards from operating in risky 





Chapter 4: Future Extensions 
This dissertation has highlighted numerous opportunities for future study. 
There is still a lot to be learned about supply chain resilience strategies that is relevant 
for supply chain management. The more global operations are the normal way of 
doing business, the more important this topic becomes. 
This study looked at actual disruptive events that firms were exposed to 
during the year of 2014 and it looked at supply chain resilience mostly on the 
proactive side of planning. I would like to follow up with a study investigating how 
many of those disruptive events became actual disruptions for the firms in our sample 
in 2014. The study would seek to look at an empirical measurement of resilience 
following Kim et al (2015) definition of resilience as the percentage of node 
disruptions that did not become network disruptions. Having such a measure would 
allow us to look at the impact of several firm characteristics on resilience and test 
empirically if mitigations strategies are effective. 
Another interesting question that remains open from our studies is the 
question regarding inventory. Following the findings of Chen et al. (2005) regarding 
better performing inventory levels, I would like to make an empirical study 
identifying lean tendencies and resilience tendencies and comparing the impact on 
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